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I. Introduction  
 In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind,1 the Supreme Court held that a North 
Carolina statute requiring professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors the average 
percentage of gross receipts they actually turned over to charities for all charitable solicitations 
conducted in the state within the previous twelve months was unduly burdensome and 
unconstitutional.  The Court applied a strict scrutiny standard of review of the regulated speech, 
rather than a more deferential standard of review for commercial speech or economic regulation.2 
The Court’s rationale was that the commercial speech elements of the charity’s message were 
inextricably intertwined with its fully protected educational portions and was constitutionally 
                                                          
1 487 U.S 781 (1988). 
2 The Charitable Solicitations Act also defined the prima facie “reasonable fee” that a professional fundraiser could 
charge according to a three-tiered schedule. A fee up to 20 percent of receipts collected was deemed reasonable; a 
fee between 20 and 35 percent was deemed unreasonable upon a showing that the solicitation at issue did not 
involve the dissemination of information, discussion, or advocacy relating to public issues as directed by the 
charitable organization that benefitted from the solicitation. A fee exceeding 35 percent of receipts collected was 
presumed unreasonable, but the fundraiser could rebut the presumption by showing that the fee was necessary either 
because the solicitation involved the dissemination of information or advocacy on public issues directed by the 
charity, or because otherwise the charity’s ability to raise money or communicate would be significantly diminished.   
Finally, the act provided that professional fundraisers could not solicit without an approved license, whereas 
volunteer fundraisers could solicit immediately upon submitting a license application. 487 U.S.at 785-787. 
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protected, even if no money was raised.  North Carolina’s regulations governing application of 
the statute were not narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s valid interests in preventing fraud, 
and protecting charities and informing donors how money contributed was spent.  
 This article disagrees with Riley’s rationale that the educational elements in charitable 
solicitation are always so interwoven with commercial speech that governmental regulation of a 
charity’s message is subject to strict judicial scrutiny as a matter of course, and protected by the 
First Amendment.3  It suggests that this conclusion does not reflect the realities of much 
fundraising speech, which is fundamentally commercial in nature, as opposed to educational or 
charitable, and argues that some charitable solicitation, where costs of fundraising over several 
years exceed eighty-five percent of the amount raised, more appropriately should be subject to a 
lesser, intermediate standard of scrutiny of review by the courts.4  Examining charitable 
fundraising from the perspective of the professional solicitor’s role, and requiring disclosure of 
fundraising costs in certain circumstances should pass constitutional muster, because it protects 
the public from deception and manipulation. 
II. Professional Solicitation 
 Nearly all charities raise funds from the public or from grant making entities in order to 
survive and thrive.5 Most organizations of size conduct their fundraising through professional 
                                                          
3 There is an exception for fraudulent or deceptive solicitation, which does not receive constitutional protection. 
4 This recommendation was suggested by Professors Espinosa and Inazu in their analyses of an earlier case relating 
to charitable solicitation,  Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), which 
was ambiguous on the standard to be applied. See, Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality of Mercy: Abandoning 
the Quest for Informed Charitable Giving, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 605 (1991); John Inazu, Making Sense of Schaumburg: 
Seeking Coherence in First Amendment Charitable Solicitation Law, 192 Marq. L. Rev. 551, 566 (2009).  
5Two exceptions are private foundations and certain social services nonprofits, the latter organized separately from 
but completely funded by government sources. Private foundations are charities that have failed several complicated 
tests of public support. Most foundations need not fundraise, because they have an endowment from which they 
cover administrative costs and make grants.  
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fundraising firms that plan and make the solicitation to the public. Not surprisingly, given the 
amount of money involved―charities raised $373 billion in 2015―charitable solicitation has 
developed into a sophisticated and lucrative business.6  Professional Solicitation firms are 
necessary accompaniments to nonprofit activity.  They can be efficient and effective enablers of 
an organization’s financial solvency and ability to achieve its charitable mission. 
 Professional solicitors, as is the case in so many occupations, are stratified by client, 
method of compensation, target audience, ethics and practices, and reputation.  Firms may offer 
their services for a fee or take a percentage of the amount raised. Fee for services is the more 
reputable approach.7   Charitable solicitation is a big business. As in any area of commerce (or 
life), participants are faced with competition, and abuses by some industry members occur. The 
criticisms discussed relate to a small and ethically challenged subset, not to the profession as a 
whole.   
                                                          
6 Jean O’Brien, Giving USA: 2015 Was America’s Most-Generous Year Ever, June 13, 2016 available at 
https://givingusa.org/giving-usa-2016/.  
7 According to a report by the Massachusetts Attorney General: “The  percentage  of  monies  raised  that  
goes  to  the  charity  can  vary widely.   The   terms   of   each   campaign   are   agreed   upon   by   both   the 
solicitor   and   the   charitable   organization   and   are   reflected   in   the contracts that are filed with the 
[Attorney General’s Office].  In  some contracts, the charity agrees to accept a percentage of funds raised, 
but it  is  far  more  common  for  the  contract  to  set  forth  the  solicitors’ cost  of performing  the  services  
involved  in  the  campaign  (for  example,  a  per- call  or  per-contact  charge  or  an  hourly  charge)  and  for  
the  charity  to agree to pay those costs and then retain the remainder of gross proceeds from the campaign. 
The percentage of gross proceeds received by the charity in those types of arrangements depends on the 
cost of the service and the results of the campaign rather than an agreed-upon percentage. 
 The cost of the solicitation service, in turn, also depends on a number of factors, including the 
type of campaign the professional solicitors are hired to run. Some firms are hired to run major events; 
some are hired to conduct telemarketing; some are retained to do face- to-face canvassing. Still others are 
hired to help with “fulfillment” during a fundraising campaign. This last category includes organizations 
that maintain 24/7 phone banks to receive calls from potential donors generated by television, radio or 
other advertisements that may be viewed well outside of normal business hours. 
 Ultimately, the amount of the funds raised that goes to the charity is a function of the agreement 
that the charity and the professional solicitor have made and the results of the campaign. As noted 
above, there is no legally required minimum amount or percentage of funds raised that must go to the 
charity…” Report on Professional Solicitations for Charity in 2013 6, Office of the Massachusetts Attorney 




 When a charitable contribution has been made, there often is no discernible outcome to 
the donor save the “warm glow” of feeling altruistic.8  A contribution is usually an act of faith 
that money donated is put to its promised use.9  Indisputably, some fraudulent or misleading 
charitable solicitation exists.  
 Many charities conduct all of their charitable solicitations through professional 
fundraising firms that plan and actually make the solicitations.10 If the fundraiser uses its own 
funds to run a campaign, usually its reimbursement comes from the dollars raised by donors’ 
contributions. The solicitor is repaid “off-the-top”.  In other words, the solicitor receives the first 
dollars contributed. For smaller charities, the lure for retaining a professional fundraising firm is 
that the charity seems to be in a win–win situation.  The fundraiser assumes the out of pocket 
costs of the campaign, and every dollar raised for the organization is a dollar that the charity did 
not previously possess. Most donors are unaware that seventy to ninety percent of their 
contribution may not reach the organization, but goes to the fundraiser. A surprising number of 
fundraising campaigns lose money, so the charity receives nothing, and in some circumstances, 
                                                          
8The phrase “warm glow” was coined by James Andreoni in his article Impure Altruism and Donations to Public 
Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 Econ. J. 464 (1990). 
9 See, Henry Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497, 505 (1981).  Sometimes 
that faith is unjustified.  A Reporter sponsored a girl from Mali through the Save the Children Federation and 
decided to visit the child.  The sponsored child had been dead for four years, and letters to donors purportedly from 
children were written by the organization.  See Lisa Anderson, The Miracle Merchants, Chic. Tribune, Mar. 15, 
1998, at 1.  The same type of deception was alleged against World Vision, a charity whose website highlights faces 
and biographies of children from impoverished places around the world.  World Vision advertised one could sponsor 
a child for $39 a month.  An Australian paid $1100 over several years to sponsor a Palestinian child, but never heard 
from him.  A reporter tracked down the child.  Neither the child nor his relatives knew he had been sponsored.  Nor 
did the child or his family receive any direct support, though the charity had contributed money to the village in 
which the child lived.  See, Diaa Hadid, Tracking the Mysteries of a Charity’s Sponsored Child, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 
2016 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/world/middleeast/worldvision-palestinians-sponsor-a-
child.html 
10 Established charities often have a development office with in-house staff, whose primary functions are to plan the 
organization’s fundraising campaign, minister to the care and feeding of existing donors, and cultivate new 
supporters. These employees are not called ‘professional solicitors’ or ‘fundraisers’, but have a more prestigious title 




owes the fundraiser money after the campaign is over11 Inefficient and losing solicitation 
campaigns still may benefit a charity. Not every fundraising campaign’s purpose is raising 
substantial sums of money. The solicitation may be an effort to educate the solicited about a new, 
unknown, or controversial cause. In this situation, the charitable solicitation is intertwined with 
the constitutionally protected free speech.  
 At the bottom of the solicitation hierarchy are fundraisers and charitable organizations 
that may be fronts for the solicitor or an organization’s officers or directors. Their organizations’ 
primary purpose is self-enrichment of the individuals involved, rather than raising funds for the 
charity or spreading a particular message. These individuals, a small part of the fundraising and 
charitable communities, engage in misrepresentation, deceit, and fraud.  Such operations are 
surprisingly difficult to shut down absent a national consent decree to cease their activities, a rare 
event.12  Such firms may be driven from one state to another or will change their corporate name 
and continue in business.  
The Problem of Solicitation Fraud 
 The scenario is common: a charity, typically with a name including an emotive word 
such as cancer, children, firefighters, police, or veterans signs a contract with a professional 
solicitor to organize and run a campaign to solicit charitable contributions. The charity may be 
                                                          
11 This occurs more often than one would think. In 16.8% of fundraising campaigns or 192 of the 1,143 campaigns 
in New York in 2015, expenses exceeded revenues raised for a loss of $16.7 million to the charities involved. 
Charities Bureau, N.Y. State Law Dep’t, Office of the Att’y Gen., Pennies for Charity Where Your Money Goes: 
Fundraising by Professional Fundraisers 1 (2016), available at: 
https://www.charitiesnys.com/pdfs/Pennies_Report_122216.pdf. Losses can occur when the fundraising contract 
does not guarantee the charity a specific dollar amount or specific percentage of the gross receipts, including when 
fundraising is incidental to the telemarketing campaign, or when the contract does not hold the charity harmless for 
expenses/fees that exceed the gross amount contributed. Id. Some of these losing campaigns were not intended to 
raise money, but focused on finding new and promising donors or educating individuals unaware of the organization 
and its mission. 




legitimate or a sham. The directors of the charity may be allied with or co-conspirators with the 
professional solicitor, or as likely, well-meaning but naïve individuals. The fundraiser raises 
millions of dollars through telemarketing, Internet, or direct mail solicitation. The charity 
receives but a small percentage of the amount raised or nothing.  
 Abuses by some nonprofits in soliciting funds from the public have been the most 
persistent problem facing state attorneys general in their regulation of charities.13 In the overall 
context of the nation’s charitable giving, the number of charity scams is small, but the amounts 
raised are surprisingly large, and the betrayal of trust of donors has a carryover effect on future 
giving, at least on those who learn their gifts were misspent.   
 In Federal Trade Commission et al. v. Cancer Fund of America, a unique example of 
collaboration between state charity regulators and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the 
FTC and attorneys general of fifty states and the District of Columbia finally shuttered a long 
existing group of sham cancer charities.  Cancer Fund of America, Breast Cancer Society, 
Cancer Support Services and Children’s Cancer Fund of America were cancer charities that 
raised $187 million from 2008 to 2012.14  The organizations told prospective donors they ran 
national programs, and their contributions would help people with cancer by providing pain 
medication to children suffering from the disease, transporting cancer patients to chemotherapy 
                                                          
13 James J. Fishman, Stephen Schwarz & Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Nonprofit Organizations: Cases and Materials   219 
(5th ed. 2015). 
14 The complaint, FTC et. al. v. Cancer Fund of America, Inc. et al., Case 2:15-cv-00884-NVW is available at 
https://a.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/Blob/If7cb7e5003c411e5bb5cdcf14584a6bb.pdf?targetType=Trial&orig
inationContext=filings&contextData=%28sc.Search%29&transitionType=FilingsItem.  The plaintiffs alleged the 
deceptive conduct violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), and the 
Telemarketing Sales Rule (“TSR”), 16 C.F.R. Part 310, as well as state statutes regarding charitable solicitations 
and prohibiting deceptive and unfair trade practices.  The FTC brought the this action under Sections 13(b) and 19 
of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 53(b) and 57b, and the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse 
Prevention Act (“Telemarketing Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108, to obtain temporary, preliminary, and permanent 
injunctive relief, rescission or reformation of contracts, restitution, the refund of monies paid, disgorgement of ill-
gotten monies, and other equitable relief for Defendants’ violations of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(a), and the TSR, 16 C.F.R. Part 310. 
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appointments, or paying for hospice care for cancer patients. None of this was true.  Instead, the 
overwhelming majority of donated funds supported the organization’s fundraisers, the individual 
defendants, and their families and friends in such activities as tuition payments, dating websites, 
ski outings, gym memberships and cruises to the Caribbean.15  
 The complaint dealt only with four years, 2008 to 2012, and the money raised in that 
period is probably long gone. The charities were controlled by James T. Reynolds, Sr., who 
organized the Cancer Fund of America in 1987, and though disciplined by several states in the 
intervening years, his organization managed to survive.  Two of the defendant charities 
immediately settled with the regulators and dissolved.  Members of Reynolds’ family and others 
affiliated with the organizations agreed to be barred from fundraising, charity management, and 
oversight of charitable assets.16 Reynolds Senior, the perpetrator of the scheme, initially refused 
to settle, and the litigation continued against him, Cancer Fund of America, and Cancer Support 
Services, the fundraising arm, but a few months later he agreed to go out of business.17    
                                                          
15 See, Rebecca R. Ruiz, 4 Cancer Charities Are Accused of Fraud, N.Y. Times, May 20, 2015 at B1; Suzanne 
Perry, $187-Million Fraud Case Puts Charities on the Defensive, Chron. Phil. June 1, 2015 available at  
https://philanthropy.com/article/187-Million-Fraud-Case-Puts/230567?cid=pt&utm_source=pt&utm_medium=en.  
16 David Fitzpatrick & Drew Griffin, Cancer charity targeted by feds agrees to put itself out of business, CNN. Feb. 
15, 2016 available at http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/15/us/cancer-fund-of-america-dissolution-agreement/.   
17 Two other leading cases of fundraising fraud in recent years include: the Disabled Veterans National Foundation 
raised $116 million using a professional solicitation firm, Quadriga Arts.  More than ninety percent of the amount 
raised went for direct mail solicitation. At the end of the campaign, the charity owed another $14 million to the 
solicitation firm that it could not pay.  As for any assistance to disabled veterans, it consisted of hand sanitizers, 
M&M’S candies, chefs’ hats, coats, and leftover shoes. In an action brought by the New York attorney general the 
fundraiser was required to forgive the debt and pay $10 million in damages.  The founding board members were 
forced to resign.  See, Suzanne Perry, N.Y. Wins $25-Million in Fundraising Abuse Case, The Chron. of 
Philanthropy, (June 30, 2014), http://philanthropy.com/article/NY-Wins-25-Million-in/147445/; David Fitzpatrick & 
Drew Griffin, Charity Marketing Group Investigated by Two States for Possible Fraud, CNN, (July 1, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/26/us/senate-charities-investigation/index.html. See 2014 N.Y. Op. Att’y Gen. 145 
(June 11, 2014), www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/DVNF-Quadriga-Convergence-AOD_14-145.PDF, for the full settlement 
agreement.    In the aftermath of the settlement, the fundraiser, the subject of other complaints over the years, 
changed its name and remains in business.   
 U.S. Navy Veterans involved the unfortunately common scheme using a purported veterans’ assistance 
charity. The U.S. Navy Veterans Association raised $27.6 million in 2009 and an estimated $100 million in all. It 
boasted of a membership of 66,000 and offices in 41 states, neither of which existed. The offices were post office 
10 
 
 It is not infrequent that by the time the attorney general or other regulator such as the 
Federal Trade Commission disciplines or shuts down a fraudulent solicitation scheme, the money 
raised has been spent. Even if the perpetrators are barred from engaging in solicitation or serving 
on a charity board―criminal prosecution is rare―there is little to deter others.  Many regulators, 
such as the IRS and most attorneys general, are ineffective or passive in this area. The Federal 
Trade Commission, the principal regulator in the Cancer Fund of America case, has no criminal 
prosecution authority.  
 Many nonprofit trade associations preach self-regulation, which often amounts to self-
protection.  Outliers, such as the organizations discussed above, could not care less about self-
regulatory norms.  As the following sections demonstrate, Constitutional principles of freedom 
of speech, press, and religion place restraints on prior regulation of charitable speech and 
solicitation.  
III. Approaches to Regulation of Charitable Solicitation 
Regulation of Religious and Charitable Solicitation through Issuance of Permits 
 Riley did not occur on a blank slate. It was a consequence of differing strands of 
constitutional development concerning the limits of regulating free speech under the First 
                                                          
boxes, and of the organization’s eighty-four purported officers, the only one who could be traced was an individual 
calling himself Bobby Thompson, whose identity had been stolen from a civilian in Washington State. U.S. Navy 
Veterans was unmasked not by federal or state charity regulators, but through the investigative reporting of the 
Tampa Bay Times.  Ohio's Attorney General took the lead in pursuing and prosecuting the perpetrator of the fraud, 
John Donald Cody.  Kris Hundley, Bobby Thompson, Fugitive from Navy Vets Charity, Caught on West Coast, 
Tampa Bay Times, (May 1, 2012),  After a cross-country search, U.S. Marshals apprehended Cody in Portland, 
Oregon. A jury ultimately found him guilty of 23 counts of fraud, money laundering, and theft. An Ohio judge then 
sentenced him to twenty-eight years in prison. Kris Hundley, U.S. Navy Veterans Association Charity Fraud Trial 




Amendment.18 Supreme Court scrutiny of restrictions on canvassing by religious or charitable 
organizations has a surprisingly long history with several intersecting threads.  The early cases 
dealt with challenges to local and state ordinances that prohibited soliciting door-to-door, 
distributing literature, or asking for contributions absent a permit approved by a government 
official. Some regulations prohibited door-to-door solicitation completely.  State courts 
construed these ordinances limiting house-to-house solicitation as a means of protecting home 
owners from fraudulent solicitation. They assumed the solicitors were engaged in their activities 
primarily for profit and therefore were not entitled to constitutional protection.  The effect of the 
earlier efforts at curtailment of canvassing was to limit the distribution of knowledge, obviously 
a free speech issue. Other cases focused on the amount of discretion vested in a state or local 
official, who used vague or non-existent criteria when issuing a permit for the distribution of 
ideas. 
 A plurality of the early decisions turned primarily, if not exclusively, upon the amount of 
discretion vested in government officials to grant or deny permits on the basis of vague or even 
non-existent criteria.19  Many of the solicitors were members of religious groups, who combined 
an effort to propagate their faith along with a request for funds.20  Another line of earlier cases 
                                                          
18 The First Amendment states: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. U.S.Constit. Amend. I. 
19 Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 640 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting); 
See, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163–164(1939); Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305–306 (1940); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 422, (1943); Hynes v. Mayor of 
Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620–621 (1976). See also, Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village 
of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, (2002). (Ordinance that prohibited canvassers from “going in and upon” private 
residential property to promote any cause without first obtaining a permit from mayor’s office and by completing 
and signing a registration form or be subject to a misdemeanor was violation of  First Amendment). 
20 Lovell v. Griffin, supra; Schneider v. State, supra; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Jamison v. 
Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
12 
 
involved the distribution of information, as opposed to requests for contributions.21  The cases 
also reaffirmed that the distribution of handbills or information for religious purposes did not 
become a commercial activity because funds were also solicited or the purchase of something, 
such as a book was encouraged, but remained protected speech.22 
 Though protecting the speech interests of solicitation, the Court conceded the “collection 
of funds” might be subject to reasonable regulation so as to protect the citizen against crime and 
undue annoyance, but the First Amendment required such controls to be drawn with “narrow 
specificity”.23  Even though the earlier cases emphasized that First Amendment principles apply 
to charitable solicitation even if contained within a request for money or purchase of a religious 
or political tract, the Court recognized the legitimate interests a town or other governmental unit 
had in some form of regulation, particularly when the solicitation of money was involved, to 
protect its citizens, their property, and right to privacy.24  There was a need to balance between 
these state interests and the effect of the regulations on First Amendment rights.25  
 Most of the earlier cases rested on the discretion of officials to issue a permit allowing 
door-to-door solicitation by religious individuals distributing information and disseminating 
ideas.  Door-to-door solicitation as the Court observed is essential to the poorly financed causes 
                                                          
21 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), for example, dealt with Jehovah's Witnesses who had gone door to door 
with invitations to a religious meeting despite a local ordinance prohibiting distribution of any “handbills, circulars 
or other advertisements” door to door. The Court noted that such an ordinance “limits the dissemination of 
knowledge,” and that it could “serve no purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution, the naked restriction of the 
dissemination of ideas.” Id., at 144, 147. 
22 Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413,417 (1943) Largent v. Texas, supra; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra. Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
23 Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, supra note 19 at 620; Martin v. Struthers, supra note 21, at 540-541. 
24 Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 162 (2002); Cantwell 
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. at 306; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. at 144.  The Court noted that if the provision in 
Watchtower had been construed to apply only to commercial activities and the solicitation of funds, arguably the 
ordinance would have been tailored to the Village’s interest in protecting the privacy of the residents and protecting 
fraud.  The ordinance, unquestionably applied to noncommercial canvassers. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 161. 
25 Id.at 163. 
13 
 
of ‘little people’.26  This article suggests there is a need to recalibrate that balance between 
government and solicitors to reflect that modern fundraising is overwhelmingly not in person 
door-to-door by ‘little people’ but through sophisticated telemarketing firms on behalf of 
charities.  Today, the ‘little people’ needing protection are the recipients of the requests, the 
public.  
Cost of Fundraising as a Limit to Charitable Solicitation 
 The efforts of state governmental bodies to regulate charitable solicitation has resembled 
a kind of guerrilla warfare where there are no final victories or defeats. After each judicial 
setback a new initiative or approach is introduced. The flashpoint of regulators’ scrutiny of 
charitable solicitation became the cost to the charity of its fundraising efforts when it hired 
professional solicitors on a contingent fee basis.  In contingent fee fundraising the charity pays 
little or nothing up front, but the solicitor receives a percentage of every dollar donated.  
  State legislators moved from unsuccessful attempts to prohibit solicitation through door-
to-door canvassing to enacting legislation that allowed charities to spend only a specified 
maximum amount on fundraising expenses with some exceptions, in order to qualify for a 
license to solicit. The theory of cost of fundraising regulation is that such limits assure charitable 
dollars are spent primarily on an organization’s charitable mission. Cost of fundraising is usually 
expressed as a ratio between the cost to a charity of raising a certain amount in a solicitation 
campaign divided by the total amount raised.27 More established charities are likely to have a 
lower Cost of Fundraising Ratio (CFR), for they can obtain contributions regularly from previous 
                                                          
26 Id. at 163 (quoting Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. at 144-146).  
27 The ratio is expressed as a total percentage of contributions received by the charity.  If a charity receives $10,000 
in contributions from a solicitation, but spends $8,000 for a professional solicitor and associated costs, the cost of 
fundraising is $8,000/$10,000 or 80%. 
14 
 
donors familiar their missions and be more attractive to newer sources of support, because of 
their reputation. For example, a university might receive annual contributions from alumni to 
endow everything from buildings to bathrooms,28 grants from foundations, governments, or other 
supporters.  
 There is distaste and distrust between more established charities and competing 
organizations that raise money for a similar cause using less efficient means such as mass 
mailings and telemarketing. Established charities have supported greater regulation of their 
newer or less prestigious competitors, and the focus has been on their cost of fundraising as an 
indicator of waste or fraud.29 They also hoped that cost of fundraising regulation would drive out 
of business unsavory competitors that relied exclusively on mass solicitation techniques.    
 Traditional or entrenched charities reasonably believe they are harmed when charitable 
dollars are not used for their intended purposes. Generous donors, whose contributions have been 
diverted, may give less in the future. Government grant-makers, whose tax dollars are wasted, 
may cut programs or support. Rightful beneficiaries of charities that use excessively paid 
solicitors may be denied services. Furthermore, the charitable sector as a whole may be 
damaged, if the public loses faith in its probity.  
 Regulators assume that charities with high fundraising costs are more likely to engage in 
fraud, excessive profit taking and waste.  However, a higher CFR may also indicate a charity of a 
different type than traditional nonprofits. The organization may be recently formed.  Its appeal 
may be for a new or controversial cause, or its primary goal may not be to raise substantial funds 
                                                          
28 In the men’s room of the Van Pelt Library of the University of Pennsylvania a urinal is endowed by an alumnus 
with a plaque: “Relief is provided by [name of alumnus].” 
29 Espinosa, supra note 4 at 650, 655. 
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but to transmit an educational message, perhaps unpopular with the public. It may solicit small 
donors through mass mailings, rather than from funding sources accessible to more established 
organizations.  It may be more difficult for a new charity to raise a dollar from a small donor, 
than for an established nonprofit to receive $1,000 from a previous contributor. A newly formed 
charity has few disincentives to continuous fundraising. Assume a charity spends ninety percent 
of every dollar raised to pay for the cost of its solicitation. The ten percent remaining is still ten 
cents more than the organization possessed than before the solicitation. 
  The belief that increased competition by charities with a high CFR impacts on the 
fundraising of more established organizations in the same field has not been proven empirically. 
More likely, the cost is that some donors are misled by similar names to well-established 
organizations or by an emotive word in the name, such as cancer, children, or veterans.  
Established charities’ fundraising should be more efficient than newer charities that have to 
spend a greater percentage of their dollars contributed to gain recognition and their mission, 
supported. 
The Fallacy of Cost of Fundraising Ratios  
 A high ratio of expenses to funds raised, though controversial, does not of itself indicate 
that a nonprofit is mismanaged, corrupt, or inefficient. Cost of fundraising ratios should be but 
one piece of data used to evaluate a charity. As stated above, a nonprofit’s CFR may be high for 
a number of legitimate reasons. Other factors such as salaries and administrative costs, 
quantitative measures of mission attainment, and the number of people actually served by the 
charity compared to other organizations in the same field may be more important than CFR.   
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  A low CFR may not indicate the ethical high ground of reasonable fundraising costs. 
Organizations may have an acceptable CFR, yet use their funds wastefully. The Wounded 
Warrior Project, the country’s largest and until recently, fastest growing veterans’ charity, had a 
CFR of forty percent, which is within the acceptable level though at the higher end. However, 
the organization spent millions of the $372 million raised in 2015 on staff travel, lavish dinners, 
hotels and conferences, and hundreds of thousands of dollars on public relations and lobbying.30 
                                                          
30 Former employees accused the organization of high overhead wasteful expenditures. Some of the programs were 
of questionable effectiveness.  The organization claimed it spent 80% of donations on programs, but it arrived at that 
figure though counting some marketing material as educational. The two top officers were forced out.  The board 
instituted a review of the organization.  It remains to be seen when, if ever, the organization will recover from the 
scandal.  Dave Philipps, Helping Veterans Recover, Spending Lavishly on Itself, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 2016 at A1; 
Chip Reid & Jennifer Janisch, Wounded Warrior Project Accused of wasting donation money, CBS News, January 
26, 2016 available at http://www.cbsnews.com/heroes/; Timothy Sandoval, Veterans Nonprofits Seek Separation 
From Wounded Warrior Project, Chron. Philanthropy, March 17, 2016 available at 
https://philanthropy.com/article/Veterans-Nonprofits-
Seek/235739?cid=pt&utm_source=pt&utm_medium=en&elqTrackId=0dcec2c1453244359fc31c6249e0028a&elq=
02423d02cdee40e1b1ee25c81466f5a6&elqaid=8302&elqat=1&elqCampaignId=2691.  Vaughn E. James, 
Restructuring Coming for Wounded Warrior Project, available at: 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/2016/08/restructuring-for-wounded-warrior-project.html.   
 In May 2017, Senator Charles Grassley, Chair of the Judiciary Committee, released an 
investigative report that concluded the Wounded Warrior Project was taking steps to remedy its 
questionable spending practices, but there remained questionable cost allocation issues.  The Senator 
offered recommendations as to how the organization can be more transparent and honest about its 
finances and better oversee its spending.  WWP claimed that 80.6% of donations were spent on programs 
for veterans, but the amount included promotional items, donated media and other costs that should have 
been characterized as program service expenses.   For IRS reporting purposes donated media is not a 
program expense.  Without including these figures, the organization spent an estimated 54-60% of 
donations helping wounded service members. WWP averred it spent more than $40 million in fundraising 
in FY 2014 that was educational in nature, and therefore program services. This was questionable under 
FASB SOP 98-2, “Accounting for Costs of Activities of Not-for-Profit Organizations and State and Local 
Governmental Entities that Include Fundraising.” WWP also stated it spent $65.4 million on long-term 
support programs.  In actuality, the organization transferred the funds to a long term support trust, whose 










 Established charities are sensitive to their own CFRs being perceived as too high and 
have taken several approaches to minimize such expenses: shaving the actual fundraising costs in 
their publicity, hiding the costs though allocation to other expense categories, or denying they 
had any such costs at all. The Red Cross, about an establishment a charity as there is, claimed on 
its website and in public comments by top executives that ninety-one cents of each dollar 
donated went directly to services, meaning only nine cents of every dollar committed was spent  
on fundraising.  A review of financial statements showed that fundraising costs averaged 
seventeen cents per donated dollar during the previous five years. One year, its CFR was twenty-
six cents of every donated dollar.31 
 Fundraising cost ratios can be hidden by allocating expenses into more donor-acceptable 
categories, such as public education, program services, general expenses or administration 
instead of fundraising.32 If a charity signs a contract with a professional fundraiser providing that 
any funds received by the charity will be after expenses, and costs have been taken out by the 
fundraiser, can the charity validly claim that it has no fundraising costs?  Two studies, several 
years apart, found a substantial percentage of charities reported on their Form 990 annual 
informational tax return that they incurred no fundraising costs, while state filing records 
revealed that in fact the organization spent substantial amounts on solicitation. 
 The first study, by the Urban Institute’s Center on Nonprofit and Philanthropy and the  
Center on Philanthropy at  Indiana University, examined 2000 tax year data and found that more   
than a third of nonprofit groups that collected $50,000 or more in contributions claimed on  their  
                                                          
31 Jesse Eisinger, Justin Elliott, & Laura Sullivan, Red Cross Misrepresented How Donors’ Dollars Are Spent, 
ProPublica & NPR, Dec. 4, 2014, available at http://www.propublica.org/article/red-cross-ceo-has-been-misleading-
about-donations.  
32 Fishman, Schwarz & Mayer, supra n. 13 at 247.  
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Form  990  that they spent nothing on fundraising, even though that was often not true. The 
researchers examined the tax returns of more than 125,000 nonprofit groups, and conducted 
surveys of overhead costs and accounting practices at 1,500 of them. They concluded that many 
organizations that receive the best ratings from watchdog groups were not as efficient as they 
claimed, and a large number lacked the capacity to track such costs accurately.33    
 A 2012 analysis by the Scripps Howard News Service of the 2010 Form 990 returns of 
37,987 charities and other nonprofits that raised at least $1 million through fundraising found 
that forty-one percent of the charities (15,389) receiving a total of $116.7 billion stated they 
spent nothing for advertising, telephone solicitations, mailed appeals, professionally prepared 
grant applications or staff time for face-to-face solicitations. For example, forty-eight of 
Goodwill Industries’ 127 major affiliates reported raising $387 million at no cost.  Of the 22,598 
organizations that did report fundraising expenses, the cost of fundraising was but seven cents 
for every dollar contributed. Robert Ottenhoff, former CEO of GuideStar and the Public 
Broadcasting Service, quipped:  “It is ridiculous to think an organization could raise significant 
amounts of money without spending money to do it.  I must be doing something wrong.  I’ve 
never seen it growing on trees.”34  
 Normally, nonprofit organizations allocate expenditures functionally, typically program 
service expenses, management and general administrative expenses, and fundraising expenses.  
These programmatic allocations reflect general accounting principles.35 They are also desired 
                                                          
33 See, Nonprofit Overhead Cost Project, What We Know about Overhead Costs in the Nonprofit Sector, Brief # 1, 
available at nccsdataweb.urban.org/kbfiles/313/Brief%201.pdf.    
34 Where Should You Give? Thousands of Nonprofits Misreporting Fundraising Costs, Scripps Howard News 
Service, May 21, 2012, available at http://nonprofitquarterly.org/?s=scripps+howard. 
35See American Institute Of Certified Professional Accountants, American Institute of Certified Professional 
Accountants, Statement of Position 98-2: Accounting for Costs of Activities of Not-for-profit organizations and 
State and Local Governmental Agencies that Include Fundraising, 20, 456  (March 11, 1998), 
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by donors and required by governmental agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service in the 
Form 990 Annual Information Return, one part of which demands that any 501(c)(3) and 
501(c)(4) organization present a statement of functional expenses. Failing to have such a 
standard is at best a soft-core sort of fraud or misrepresentation. 
 Because the rules for determining overhead costs such as CFR are vague, and every 
charity seems to interpret them differently, some charity watchdogs, such as the Better Business 
Bureau Wise Giving Alliance, Guidestar, and Charity Navigator have criticized the emphasis on 
overhead ratios or cost of fundraising, and suggest donors should focus on the charity’s 
effectiveness measured by impact of the organization on its beneficiaries, a much more difficult 
task.36  Charity Navigator has deemphasized overhead in its ratings. Other watchdogs disagree.   
                                                          
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobnocache=true&blobwhere=1175820927486&blobheader=appl
ication/pdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs. SOP 98-2 establishes accounting standards to assure 
nonprofit organizations accurately state the amount of fundraising and other costs. This requires allocation of 
fundraising costs even if they are a joint activity with a programmatic or administrative function. If the fundraising 
cannot be reasonably allocated in part to another functional classification, it should be reported as fundraising costs. 
Id. 
36 See, Press Release, Tim Ogden, Philanthropy Action, The Worst (and Best) Way to Pick a Charity This Year 
(Dec. 1, 2009), http://philanthropyaction.com/nc/the_worst_and_best_way_to_pick_a_charity_this_year/. Less than 
two weeks after the publication of the “America’s Worst Charities” report, BBB Wise Giving Alliance, Charity 
Navigator and Guidestar, three charity rating organizations, commenced a campaign to persuade donors to look 
beyond overhead costs when deciding which groups to support because overhead is a poor measure of a charities’ 
performance. The statement concedes “at the extreme” high spending on overhead can tip off donors to fraud or 
poor financial management. The three organizations did not invite a fourth watchdog, Charity Watch to participate, 
because it rates charities exclusively on their financial performance. See, Suzanne Perry, 3 Major Charity Groups 
Ask Donors to Stop Focusing on Overhead Costs, THE CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY (June 17, 2013), 
http://philanthropy.com/article/3-Major-Charity-Groups-  Ask/139881/?cid=pt&utm_source=pt&utm_medium=en; 
Suzanne  Perry, Overhead Costs Pose Dilemma for Charities, THE CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY (May 19, 2013), 
http://philanthropy.com/article/Overhead-Costs-Pose-Dilemma/139329/.   
36The Revised Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice provide more flexibility for overhead costs.  
Previously, the Principles stated that charities should spend a significant amount of their expenses on programs with 
a target of 65% of expenses. The revision says spending 65% of expenses on program activities and more on 
overhead is sometimes necessary. Alex Daniels, New Charity Guidelines Deal With Online Fraud, Overhead, and 




One can assume charities that have extraordinarily high fundraising costs over many 
years are less effective and more likely to have issues of waste or fraud.37  At some point, does a 
high CFR over many years indicate the charity is serving a private purpose, which would make   
the organization ineligible for tax exemption?  Though every fundraising campaign tries to 
include some educational speech, which is protected, after years of high CFR and little 
expenditure on mission, should this indicate the speech component is merely formulaic, or even 
deceptive rather than meaningful, and demonstrates no one is listening? 
 Constitutional Limits to Cost of Fundraising Regulation: The Supreme Court Trilogy 
 Three cases involving maximum allowable fundraising statutes reached the Supreme 
Court.  All were declared unconstitutional, because they were overly broad and impinged on 
constitutionally protected speech.38  In reaching this conclusion the Supreme Court applied a 
standard of strict scrutiny to state regulatory efforts.   
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment39 
                                                          
37 See, Suzanne Perry, 3 Major Charity Groups Ask Donors to Stop Focusing on Overhead Costs, Chron. 
Philanthropy, June 17, 2013 available at: http://philanthropy.com/article/3-Major-Charity-Groups-
Ask/139881/?cid=pt&utm_source=pt&utm_medium=en, 
www.philanthropyaction.com/documents/Worst_Way_to_Pick_A_Charity_Dec_1_2009.pdf.    
38 The overbreadth doctrine holds that a law may be invalidated on grounds that it is overbroad i.e. the statute or 
ordinance sweeps within its coverage too much. It is an exception to two traditional rules of constitutional litigation. 
First, it results in the invalidation of a law on its face, as opposed to its application to a particular speaker or 
plaintiff. Ordinarily, a litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutionally applied to him/her.  If the litigant prevails, 
the courts sever the application of the unconstitutional aspect by invalidating the improper application on a case- by- 
case basis.  If it’s inapplicable to that speaker, it is trimmed down only as to similarly situated individuals.   
Kathleen M. Sullivan & Noah Feldman, Constitutional Law 1278 (18th ed. 2013).  When the law is invalidated for 
overbreadth the statute is unenforceable, unless it is rewritten by the legislature or construed more narrowly. Id.  
Second, overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the normal rule of standing that requires challengers to a law to 
assert their own interests, rather than those of third parties.  Overbreadth doctrine allows challengers to assert the 
rights of third parties, who may be reluctant to assert their rights. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972).  
39 Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
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 The village of Schaumburg, Illinois enacted an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door or on-
street solicitation of contributions by charitable organizations that did not use at least 75 percent 
of their receipts for charitable purposes. Such purposes were defined to exclude cost of 
solicitation, salaries, overhead, and other administrative expenses. After the Village denied a 
solicitation permit to Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), a nonprofit environmental-
protection organization, because it could not meet the ordinance’s 75-percent requirement, CBE 
sued in Federal District Court, alleging that such a requirement violated the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.  
 The legal issue was whether the Village had exercised its power to regulate solicitation in 
a manner that did not intrude upon the rights of free speech. The District Court granted summary 
judgment for CBE, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The 
Appeals Court concluded that even if the 75-percent requirement might be valid as applied to 
other types of charitable solicitation, it was unreasonable on its face because it barred solicitation 
by advocacy-oriented organizations even where the contributions would be used for reasonable 
salaries of those who gathered and disseminated information relevant to the organization’s 
purpose.  
 The Appeals Court distinguished National Foundation v. Fort Worth,40  which upheld an 
ordinance authorizing denial of charitable solicitation permits to organizations with excessive 
solicitation costs, on the ground that although the Fort Worth ordinance deemed unreasonable 
solicitation costs in excess of 20 percent of gross receipts, it nevertheless permitted organizations 
that demonstrated the reasonableness of such costs to obtain solicitation permits.41 
                                                          
40 415 F.2d 41 5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040, (1970). 
41 444 U.S.at 627-628. 
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 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ finding that the ordinance in Schaumberg 
was constitutionally overbroad and violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.42  It reviewed 
prior cases that established charitable appeals for funds involved a variety of speech interests 
within the protection of the First Amendment. Though solicitation was subject to reasonable 
regulation, such regulatory efforts had to be undertaken with due regard for the reality that it was 
characteristically intertwined with informative and persuasive speech, seeking support for 
particular causes or views on economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality that without 
solicitation, the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease.  Additionally, since 
charitable solicitation did more than inform private economic decisions and was not primarily 
concerned with providing information about the characteristics and costs of goods and services, 
it could not be considered as a variety of purely commercial speech.43 
 The ordinance at issue in Schaumberg would be unconstitutionally applied to advocacy 
organizations that not only compensated solicitors, but also paid others to obtain, process, and 
disseminate the organization’s positions on items of interest.  Such organizations would 
necessarily spend more than the 75 percent limit, and such information and advocacy would 
likely cease.44  Unless it served a sufficiently strong, subordinating interest that the Village was 
entitled to protect, the ordinance could not be sustained. The Village’s justification of prevention 
                                                          
42 Id. at 636. Note for purposes of the Overbreadth Doctrine, the Court held the appellate tribunal was free to inquire 
whether the ordinance was overbroad, a question that involved no dispute about CBE’s characteristics. Even if there 
was no demonstration CBE was one of the organizations affected, the ordinance purported to prohibit a substantial 
category of charities to which the 75-percent limitation could not be applied consistently with First and Fourteenth 
Amendment principles, Id. at 634-635. 
43 Schaumburg, 444 U.S.at 632.  The fact that speech was in the form of a solicitation to pay or contribute money 
did not affect its protection.  New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 
U.S.350 (1977).   
44 Schaumberg, 444 U.S. at 635-636. 
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of the public from fraud, crime and undue annoyance could be sufficiently served by measures 
more narrowly drawn and less destructive of First Amendment interests.45 
 The Supreme Court seemed to agree with the exception carved out by the Appeals Court 
for organizations whose primary purpose was not to provide money or services for the poor, the 
needy, or other worthy objects of duty but to gather and disseminate information about advocacy 
positions on matters of public concern. Such organizations may pay reasonable salaries, which 
by the nature of their work would exceed the 75% CFR limit in the statute.  Thus, the ordinance 
was an unjustified infringement of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.46 The Court seemed 
to accept that CFR limits might be enforceable against more traditional charitable organizations’ 
purely commercial solicitations. 
 The Schaumberg decision did not ignore the interests of the community or state in 
protecting its citizens from fraud, preventing their access to property, or their rights of privacy. 
The Supreme Court suggested more narrow means than a direct prohibition of a certain level of 
CFR might fulfill the Village’s interest in preventing fraud.  These included: denouncing frauds 
and criminal offenses punishment through the penal laws; permitting homeowners to bar 
solicitors from their property by posting signs reading “No Solicitors or Peddlers Invited,” and 
efforts by the Village and the state of Illinois to promote disclosure of charities’ finances, so 
potential donors are informed of the ways their contributions will be employed.47 
 As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent, Schaumberg differed from its precedents, 
a plurality of which turned on the discretion of the licensing authority to issue a permit.  Others 
                                                          
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 635-636. 
47 Id. at 637-638. 
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involved the distribution of information as opposed to requests for money.48 He noted that from a 
practical standpoint, the decision offered no guidance as to how a municipality might identify 
those organizations “where the primary purpose is…to gather and disseminate positions on 
matters of public concern.”49  This, in fact, has become a problem: a dollop of speech in a sea of 
commercial seeking of funds tilts to the constitutionally protected side of the equation, thereby 
offering broad access to deceptive fundraising.   
 Furthermore, by triggering a solicitation as protected speech, Schaumberg seemed to 
make any attempt to regulate such activity as possibly subject to a strict standard of review, but 
this interpretation of the decision is ambiguous. To pass the strict scrutiny standard, a legislature 
must have passed the particular law under review to further a "compelling governmental 
interest," and must have narrowly tailored the law to achieve that interest.50  
 Schaumberg created at least three ambiguities that subsequent cases resolved. The first 
was the distinction between traditional charitable organizations providing services, which 
seemingly could be limited by a CFR requirement, and advocacy organizations that could not be 
so restricted.  Second, what was the level of scrutiny that should be applied by a court to 
legislation that limited the amount of funds an organization could spend on fundraising 
expenses? Schaumberg was unclear whether such statutes should receive intermediate or strict 
scrutiny. As Professor John Inazu has demonstrated, in the aftermath of Schaumberg the federal 
courts were all over the lot.51  A third ambiguity was the question whether the deficiency of the 
ordinance in Schaumberg could be rectified by giving a state official authority to waive the flat 
                                                          
48 Id. at 640-642. 
49 Id. at 642-643. 
50 Strict scrutiny is a form of judicial review that courts use to determine the constitutionality of certain laws. See 
infra pp. 55-56 for a discussion of the levels of scrutiny  
51 Inazu, supra note 4 at 551, 566. 
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CFR mandate. The uncertainty as to the standard of scrutiny given to statutes regulating CFR 
solicitation was corrected in Munson and Riley. 
Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co.52  
 Munson involved a Maryland statute prohibiting solicitations by any charity that did not 
use seventy-five percent of its receipts for charitable purposes, the same percentage limitation as 
the ordinance in Schaumberg.53 However, the Maryland statute authorized a waiver of this 
limitation where it would effectively prevent the organization from raising contributed funds.54  
The issue in Munson was whether the addition of an administrative waiver of the limitation 
enabled the ordinance to withstand constitutional attack. 
 Joseph H. Munson Company, Inc. was a professional fundraiser that promoted 
fundraising events and gave advice on how they should be conducted. Among Munson’s clients 
were several Maryland chapters of the Fraternal Order of Police.  Munson regularly charged 
more than the twenty-five percent of the gross raised for the events it promoted.  One of its 
clients refused to contract with the Munson Company because of the percentage limitation.  
Munson brought suit claiming the Maryland Secretary of State threatened it with prosecution, if 
the Munson Company refused to comply with the statute, and the percentage limitation would 
violate the rights of free speech of Munson’s clients under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.55  The lower Maryland courts upheld the statute, but the Maryland Court of 
                                                          
52 467 U.S. 947, 104 S. Ct. 2839, 81 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1984). 
53 Md.  Ann. Code   Art. 41 § 103D (1982). 
54 The waiver section of the statute read as follows: “The Secretary of State shall issue rules and regulations to permit 
a charitable organization to pay or agree to pay for expenses in connection with a fund-raising activity more than 25% 
of its total gross income in those instances where the 25% limitation would effectively prevent the charitable 
organization from raising contributions.” Id. at (a). 
55 Another issue in the case was whether Munson as a third party, rather than Maryland charities that were the direct 
entities regulated by the Maryland Statute, had standing to challenge the percentage limitation.  Any litigant must 
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Appeals found it was not a narrowly drawn regulation designed to serve the State’s legitimate 
interests without interfering with First Amendment freedoms.56 
 The Supreme Court rejected the assumption that a high CFR indicated a probability of 
fraud. It recognized there were organizations with high fundraising costs unrelated to protected 
First Amendment activity, which could have their activities prohibited. The problem with the 
Maryland statute was it could not distinguish between such organizations from charities with 
high costs due to protected First Amendment activities.57 The statute’s flaw was that it operated 
on a fundamentally mistaken premise that high solicitation costs were an accurate measure of 
fraud. Restricting solicitation costs may do nothing to prevent fraud58 
 The court denied the waiver option as a corrective to constitutional objections to the 
statute: “while the possibility of a waiver might decrease the number of impermissible 
applications of the statute, it did nothing to remedy the statute’s fundamental defect: the 
imposition of a direct restriction on protected First Amendment activity, and the means chosen to 
                                                          
satisfy the “case” or “controversy” jurisdictional requirement of Article III of the Constitution. The “case or 
controversy” requirement of Article III restricts federal courts to the resolution of concrete disputes between the parties 
before them, rather than hypothetical situations.  Because its contracts called for payment in excess of 25% of the 
funds raised at a given event, Munson suffered potential civil and criminal liability. As mentioned in the text one of 
its clients was reluctant to enter into a contract because of the percentage limitation, and Munson had been informed 
it would be prosecuted if he failed to comply with the statute.  The Court found Munson satisfied the case or 
controversy requirement, because he was threatened with actual and threatened injury as a result of the statute. In 
addition to the limitations on standing, plaintiffs must normally assert their own legal rights and not the rights of third 
parties.  Where the claim is that the statute is overly broad in violation of the First Amendment, and the statute is 
directed at persons with whom the plaintiff has a business or professional relationship, and impairs the plaintiff in that 
relationship, the plaintiff is accorded standing to challenge the validity of the statute, even though Munson’s own 
activities are not constitutionally protected. The existence of the statute could chill challenge of it by primary parties 
for fear of punishment. The Court cited Schaumberg, at 444 U.S. 634. Note that though Munson was the plaintiff in 
the lower court cases, since the Secretary of State appealed the highest Maryland court’s decision, Munson became 
the respondent in the Supreme Court case. Justice Stevens in a concurring opinion felt that while the writ of certiorari 
should never been issued, there were sufficient reasons for finding Munson’s third party standing was proper.  467 
U.S. at 973-974.  
56 Joseph H. Munson Co. v. Secretary of State, 294 Md. 160, 181, 448 A.2d 935, 946 (1982). The Court cited 
Schaumberg at 444 U.S., at 637.  
57 467 U.S. at 966. 
58 Id. at 967. 
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accomplish the state’s objectives were too imprecise.59 The fact that the Munson statute 
regulated all charitable fundraising and not just door-to- door solicitation did not remedy the fact 
that the statute promotes the state’s interest only peripherally.60 
 In dissent61 Justice Rehnquist challenged the majority’s use of the overbreadth doctrine 
for allowing review by the defendant. The dissent considered the Maryland statute functioned as 
an economic regulation by setting a limit on the fees charged by professional fundraisers, a 
differentiation from Schaumberg, which the dissent interpreted as primarily controlling the 
nature and internal workings of charitable organizations seeking to solicit in the Village. The 
Schaumberg statute’s main failing was it effectively prohibited any solicitation by organizations 
that were primarily engaged in research, advocacy, or public education and used their own paid 
staff to carry out those functions as well as to solicit financial support. Such advocacy 
organizations were likely to have high administrative expenses making it impossible for them to 
qualify for a permit.  In contrast, the Maryland statute in contrast was directed primarily at 
controlling the external economic relations between charities and professional fundraisers and 
should be judged under the minimum rationality standard traditionally applied to economic 
regulation.62   
 The dissent found that the limitation on fundraiser’s fees served a number legitimate and 
substantial government interests.  It insured that funds solicited from the public for a charitable 
purpose would not be excessively diverted to private pecuniary gain.  The limitation encouraged 
the public to give with confidence that money designated for a charity will be spent on charitable 
                                                          
59 467 U.S. 968. 
60 Munson was a 5 to 4 decision with a concurrence by Justice Stevens. 
61 Joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell and O’Connor.  
62 467 U.S. 978-980. 
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purposes.  Moderate fundraising fees coincided with contributors’ expectations that their 
contributions would go primarily to the charitable purpose for which the funds were solicited and 
protected the charities themselves.63 
Riley v. National Federation of the Blind  
 In Riley the state of North Carolina for the first time directly asserted an interest in 
“ensuring that the maximum amount of funds would reach the charity.”64  This goal would be 
assisted by a three tier sliding scale of permissible contingent fees.65  The Court rejected the 
paternalistic view that charities were unable to negotiate fair and reasonable contracts without 
governmental assistance or that charities were incapable of deciding for themselves the most 
effective way to exercise their First Amendment rights. The speakers not the government knew 
best what to say and how to say it.66   
 North Carolina also maintained that the Act’s flexibility, unlike Schaumberg and 
Munson, was more narrowly tailored to state interests. The Court rejected the distinction. 
Permitting rebuttal of the CFR limits by the solicitor did not create a nexus between the 
percentages and the State’s interest. Even if some form of percentage-based measure could be 
used in part to test for fraud, the Court would not require the speaker to prove the 
appropriateness of the fee on a case by case basis.67 
                                                          
63 Id. at 980-981. 
64 487 U.S. 789. 
65 Fees not greater than 20% of gross receipts were presumed reasonable; fees between 20% and 35% were 
reasonable unless the challenging party could show that a particular solicitation campaign did not dissinate ideas or 
information; and fees over 35% were presumed unreasonable, subject to rebuttal by the professional solicitor. Riley, 
487 U.S. at 784-785. 
66 487 U.S. at 790-791. 
67 Id. at 793.  
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 Riley rejected point of disclosure of financial information. The Court found mandating 
speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech, and 
was therefore content based regulation.68  As a result the statute was subject to exacting First 
amendment scrutiny. The Court elaborated: 
“Our lodestar in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to compelled statement must be 
the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled statement 
thereon. This is the teaching of Schaumberg and Munson in which we refused to separate 
the component parts of charitable solicitations from the fully protected whole. Regulation 
of the solicitation “must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is 
characteristically [emphasis added] intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive 
speech…, and the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and 
advocacy would likely cease.”69  
 The reality, however, is that many charitable solicitations are primarily commercial, and the 
speech components are an unimportant, if not formulaic, part of the pitch. 
 The State argued that the speech regulated was commercial, because it only related to the 
professional fundraisers’ profit. Therefore, the more deferential commercial speech standard 
should apply.70  The Court responded that speech did not retain its commercial character when 
                                                          
68 Id. at 795. 
69 Id. 796. 
70 In 1976 commercial speech received First and Fourteenth Amendment protection, albeit at a lower level than fully 
protected speech.  Though an advertiser's interest in commercial advertisement was purely economic, this did not 
disqualify it from constitutional protection, for both individual consumers and society in general may have strong 
interests in the free flow of commercial information. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980), the Supreme Court established a four pronged , somewhat vague test for permissible governmental 
restrictions on commercial speech: 1) the commercial speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading;  2) 
the government’s interest in restricting the speech must be substantial; 3) the restriction must directly advance the 
government’s asserted interest; and 4) the restriction must not be more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted 
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inextricably intertwined with fully protected speech.  But what if the commercial component is 
not intrinsically intertwined?  Aside from questions of First Amendment precedent, the Court’s 
conclusion on mandated disclosure made practical sense.  Just imagine the chances of success of 
a solicitation where the solicitor says in the course of the pitch: “85% of the money raised goes 
to me or my firm.”   
In Riley the Court found that the justifications for CFR disclosure was not as weighty as 
the state asserted, and the means chosen taken as a whole were unduly burdensome, not narrowly 
tailored, and endangered the freedom of protected speech.71 The effect of the compelled 
statement of CFR changed the content of the speech. The court assumed that charitable 
solicitation was always intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech, and without 
the solicitation, the flow of information and advocacy would cease.   Consequently, the content 
based North Carolina statute was subject to exacting First Amendment principles, in other words 
strict scrutiny.72   
 Justice Rehnquist with Justice O’Connor in dissent considered the disclosure requirement 
commercial speech and the statute price control regulation. They interpreted the statute as merely 
                                                          
government interest. The Court has upheld compelled disclosure when necessary to prevent speech which is false, 
deceptive, misleading, or which proposes illegal transactions. Zauderer v. Office of Discilinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 
626 (1985). The Central Hudson test for commercial speech has been applied in a manner that exemplifies 
“intermediate scrutiny.  Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. Va. L. Rev. 867, 881 (2015); Allen 
Rostron, Pragmatism, Paternalism, and the Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 37 Vt. L. Rev. 527, 
530 (2013) but see Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).  This article does not suggest that charitable 
solicitation speech is merely or should be considered under commercial speech doctrines, only that the intermediate 
standard of review be applied to it.  
71 Id. at 798-799. 
72 The statute’s licensing requirement was unconstitutional because it required professional fundraisers to await a 
determination regarding their license application before engaging in solicitation, while volunteer fundraisers or those 
employed by the charity may solicit immediately upon submitting an application. A speaker’s rights were not lost 
just because compensation is received.  The State's power to license professional fundraisers comes with it, unless 
properly constrained, the power to affect speech they utter. If a license is required, the regulation must provide that 
licensor will within a brief period get the license or be able to go to court. Here the statute permitted a delay without 
limit. Riley, 487 U.S. 801-802. 
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requiring that no professional fundraiser can charge an unreasonable fee. Therefore, it had a 
small, indirect impact upon speech. Unlike fixed percentages in other the cases, here the statute 
determined reasonableness, and disclosure of the percentage was not a burden on speech.73 
 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence clearly demonstrates that charitable appeals for 
funds, on the street or door to door, involve a variety of speech interests—communication of 
information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of 
causes—that are within the protection of the First Amendment. The trilogy of cases refused to 
separate the speech involved into component parts of protected and unprotected. As the Court 
noted in Schaumburg: 
 “Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable regulation but the latter 
must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically 
intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for 
particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social issues, and for 
the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would 
likely cease. Canvassers in such contexts are necessarily more than solicitors for money. 
Furthermore, because charitable solicitation does more than inform private economic 
decisions, and is not primarily concerned with providing information about the 
characteristics and costs of goods and services, it has not been dealt with in our cases as a 
variety of purely commercial speech.”74 
  The Court’s rejection of cost of fundraising regulation in the three cases resulted 
in the demise of that regulatory approach, except through filing of such information with the 
                                                          
73 Id. at 804-812. 
74 444 U.S. 620, 632. 
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state, which has occurred in many states, and is often available to the public, if it seeks the 
information online.  Nevertheless, the Court offered some more narrowly tailored options: the 
state itself could publish the detailed forms professional fundraisers file, or it could enforce its 
antifraud laws.75  The problem with the first option suggested, adopted in many states where the 
forms often are available online, is that the public doesn’t utilize the opportunity.  The second 
suggestion is more flawed.  Realistically, the cost of investigating and bringing suit pursuant to 
an allegation of fraud is so expensive and resource consumptive that only a very few state 
attorneys general have the resources.to engage in such litigation on a regular basis.  
 Riley contains at least two misconceptions and one unintended consequence about 
charitable solicitation that do not reflect a substantial part of modern fundraising. First, the Court 
assumed that solicitation is always interwoven with protected speech. In the hypothetical 
solicitations discussed in this paper―years of 85% CFRs plus administrative expenditures and 
generous staff compensation―the protected speech component may be an insignificant 
formulaic part of the solicitation.  A cancer charity that in the course of its pitch for money says 
“eating blueberries contains oxidants to prevent cancer,”76 a statement that may be valid, but 
should not in and of itself be sufficient protected speech interwoven with the solicitation so as to 
gain entry to the strict scrutiny category of review.   
 Second, the Court criticized the statute at issue in Riley for its paternalism to charities that 
can protect themselves and know what is in their best interest.77 The focus should be on the 
protection of the public, who may not be as easily able to protect themselves. An unintended 
                                                          
75 487 U.S. 800. 
76 The author, who has eaten blueberries in that belief for years, was chagrined to learn that it may not be so! See, 
Gina Kolata, Food and Exercise Have One Big Problem, N.Y. Times, August 11 2016, at A3. 
77 487 U.S.790-791. 
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consequence of adopting the strict scrutiny level of analysis means almost all state charitable 
solicitation regulation that affects some speech will be rejected. In practice what has happened is 
unless there are blatant allegations of fraud resulting from a number of complaints by the public, 
attorneys general are unlikely to pursue solicitation cases.  However, fraudulent solicitation 
statements remain constitutionally unprotected.78  
IV. Regulation of Charitable Solicitation after Riley  
Case Developments 
 In the aftermath of Riley lower federal courts voided several state CFR statutes similar to 
North Carolina’s though some allowed mandated disclosure.79  States have succeeded in 
                                                          
78  Despite the holding in Riley finding the organization’s solicitation protected speech, the Court suggested that the 
state can enforce its anti-fraud laws to prohibit professional fundraisers from obtaining money by false pretenses or 
by making false statements. 487 U.S. 795. The Illinois attorney general sued a professional fundraiser for fraud, 
contending that the fundraiser knowingly misrepresented to donors that a significant amount of each dollar donated 
would be paid over to charity when in fact the fundraiser retained eighty-five percent of the gross receipts raised. 
The Illinois Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the state attempted to regulate the fundraiser’s 
ability to engage in protected activity based upon a percentage-rate limitation rejected in Riley.   In Illinois ex rel. 
Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, 538 U.S.600 (2003) the Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Treating 
the case as a fraud action, the Court held fraudulent charitable solicitation is unprotected speech, and the states may 
maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false or misleading misrepresentations designed to deceive donors 
about how their donations will be used.  The Court distinguished fraud actions, which focus on representations made 
in individual cases, from statutes that categorically ban solicitations when fundraising costs run high. In Riley, the 
statute did not depend on whether the fundraiser made fraudulent representations to potential donors. The First 
Amendment, stated the Court in Madigan, did not require a blanket exemption from fraud liability for a fundraiser, 
who intentionally misled in its appeal for donations.  538 U.S. 612.  The Court noted, however, that high fundraising 
costs by themselves or mere failure to voluntarily disclose the fundraiser’s fee when contacting a potential donor do 
not, without more, establish fraud. 
79 See, National Federation of Blind of Texas, Inc. v. Abbott, 682 F.Supp.2d 700 (N.D. Tex. 2010)(Statute 
requiring companies that solicited and resold donations of clothing and other household items on behalf of 
charities to disclose the amount of money received by the charities and specify whether the sum was a 
set percentage or a flat fee was not narrowly tailored and was an unconstitutional restriction on speech 
even though receptacles for donations were not staffed, and the solicitors rarely disclosed their names but 
used the name of a charity); Nebraska v. Kelley, 249 Neb. 99, 541 N.W.2d 645 (1996) (statute which required 
certification in letter of approval from county attorney before charitable solicitation was permitted outside 
organization’s home county constituted unconstitutional prior restraint, overbreadth and vagueness); Kentucky State 
Police Prof. Ass'n v. Gorman, 870 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Ky. 1994) (Provision of Kentucky Consumer Protection Act 
prohibiting representation that charity will be recipient of funds if professional solicitor has contract that will allow 
it to receive more than 50% of gross receipts unduly burdensome and not narrowly tailored to state's interest in 
preventing fraud, and thus violates First Amendment);  Shannon v. Telco Communications, Inc., 824 F.2d 150, 152-
54 (1st Cir. 1987) (voiding a Massachusetts statute that limited a solicitor’s compensation to 25% of receipts); 
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expanding the scope of compelled point-of-disclosure in small ways. Riley opened the door for 
this when the Court said in dictum:  “[N]othing in this opinion should be taken to suggest that the 
State may not require a fundraiser to disclose unambiguously his or her professional status. On 
the contrary, such a narrowly tailored requirement would withstand First Amendment 
scrutiny.”80 The Court suggested more benign and narrowly tailored options. It gave as an 
example that the State may itself publish the detailed financial disclosure forms it requires 
professional solicitors to file which would communicate the desired information to the public 
without burdening a speaker with unwanted speech in the course of his solicitation.81  States have 
followed this guidance.82 
Mandated Disclosure and Its Discontents 
 Riley did not prohibit all regulation of charitable solicitation.  It held that “The interest in 
protecting charities (and the public) from fraud is, of course, a sufficiently substantial interest to 
justify a narrowly tailored regulation.”83  In striking down the restrictions on fundraising fees the 
                                                          
Indiana Voluntary Firemen’s Ass’n v. Pearson, 700 F. Supp. 42, 442-447 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (striking down, in part, an Indiana 
statute that required both oral and written disclosures of the percentage of funds raised that were paid to the 
solicitor); Telco Communications, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 700 F. Supp. 294, 296-97 (E.D. Va. 1988) (striking down a 
Virginia provision that required a point-of-solicitation disclosure of the minimum percentage of funds that would go 
to the charity), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 885 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1989), and cert. denied., 495 U.S. 905 (1990); 
People v. French, 762 P.2d 1369, 1374-75 (Colo. 1988) (holding unconstitutional the compelled disclosure by 
fundraisers if the charity retained less than 50% of gross receipts); WRG Enters., Inc. v. Crowell, 758 S.W.2d 214, 
217-19 (Tenn. 1988) (striking down a compensation limit of 15% of gross receipts).79   
80  478 U.S. at 799 n. 11. 
81 Id. at   800.  
82 See, Telco Communications v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d at 1231-32 (Solicitation code requiring professional solicitors 
to disclose in writing at the time of solicitation that financial statement for last fiscal available year available upheld  
as preventing fraud and not inherently incompatible with First Amendment);   Tennessee Law Enforcement Youth Found. v. 
Millsaps, 1991 WL 523878 (W.D. Tenn.1991). (Requirement that professional solicitors disclose in writing at the time of 
solicitation that a financial statement for the last fiscal year was available consistent with Riley based upon a finding of a 
sufficient state interest in donor education); See also, Famine Relief Fund v. West Virginia, 905 F.2d 747, 750 (4th 
Cir.1990). (Provision requiring charitable expenditures to be “related in a primary degree to [the] stated purpose ... 
in accordance with reasonable donor expectations” was constitutional. West Virginia statute imposed no actual 
percentage-based limitations, and thus survived Riley). Id. at 751-52. This was dictum because the court found the 
statute defective on independent due process grounds. Id.at 754. 
83 Riley 781 U.S. at 792. 
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Court did not suggest that states must sit idly by and allow their citizens to be defrauded.  It 
noted that North Carolina (and other states) could constitutionally require fundraisers to disclose 
certain financial information to the state as it had.84  
 Many states turned to increased mandatory disclosure of financial and other information, 
not all of which was available to the public in place of CFR regulation.85  At the federal level 
Form 990s, the annual information returns required by the IRS became available on line, 
providing substantial information for public scrutiny of all section 501(c)(3) tax exempt 
organizations. Most states require charities to register their contracts with fundraisers, and a few 
publish the names of charities and professional solicitors that have particularly high percentages 
of fundraising costs in the eyes of regulators.86 
 Mandated disclosure (MD) is supposed to give individuals information for analyzing 
their choices, in this case whether to contribute to a particular organization.  This information 
should result in better decision making.87   MD assumes the information available will reflect the 
quality of the charity’s work and will influence the potential donor’s decision.  As the discussion 
of CFR suggested, there may be a weak correlation, if any at all, between a high CFR and 
inefficiency, waste, or fraud. Assembling the data is subjective as the organization allocates costs 
                                                          
84 Id.at 795. 
85 Three states, Hawaii, California, and New York have required the submission of Schedule B of the Form 990 
Annual Information return, which lists substantial donors to the charity and is not available to the public, to be filed 
with the attorney general.  Litigation is pending challenging the California and New York regulations.  See, 
Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Harris, 182 F. Supp. 3d 1049 (C.D. Ca. 2016), appeal docketed; Citizens 
United v. Schneiderman, __F.3d__ 2016 WL 4521627 (Aug. 29, 2016), appeal docketed. 
86 See, "Pennies for Charity" - The Attorney General's Report on Fundraisers in New York (2016) available at 
https://www.charitiesnys.com/pdfs/Pennies_Report_122216.pdf.  




rather than the regulator, and charities can juggle the numbers through assigning fundraising 
costs to programming expenses.88 
 Mandated disclosure gives legislators and regulators a pass in the sense that they can 
comfort themselves that mandated disclosure is an effective weapon against fraud and deceit.  
However, MD doesn’t affect charities’ behavior substantially as few donors seek the 
information. In Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s well-crafted prose:  
 Mandated disclosure is a Lorelei, luring lawmakers onto the rocks of regulatory 
failure. It is alluring because it resonates with two fundamental American ideologies. The 
first is free-market principles. Mandated disclosure may constrain unfettered rapacity and 
counteracts caveat emptor, but the intervention is soft and leaves everything substantive 
alone: prices, quality, [and] entry.  Instead of specifying outcomes of transactions or 
dictating choices, it proffers information for making better decisions.  Second, mandated 
disclosure…supposes that people make better decisions for themselves than anyone can 
make for them and that people are entitled to freedom in making decisions. 
 Mandated disclosure appeals to lawmakers for other reasons. First, it looks cheap. 
It requires almost no government expenditures, and its costs seem to be imposed on the 
story's villain, the stronger party who withholds information. Second, mandated 
disclosure looks easy. It just requires more communication between parties who are 
already communicating; in hindsight, the information that could have led a trouble-story 
victim to a better decision seems obvious…. 
                                                          
88 See, supra pp.16-20. 
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 Third, mandated disclosure looks effective. Mandated information often seems 
relevant to a difficult decision… For all these reasons, lawmakers rarely inquire into the 
effectiveness or burden of disclosure.”89 
 Mandatory disclosure does little to improve donor knowledge or protection.  Information 
can be difficult to find on line and not readily understandable.  The Form 990 Annual 
Information Return is an example. The length of the form requires a level of knowledge that the 
average donor neither has, not desires to attain.  For donors contributing small amounts, failure 
acquire the knowledge needed to investigate the mandatorily disclosed information may be 
viewed as rational apathy.90  This means the cost of finding the information necessary to make 
the correct decision to donate is not be worth the time expended, particularly when the main 
benefit small donors receive may be a sense of community or religiosity or the warm glow of 
doing a good deed.91  
V. A Presumption against Permission to Solicit Where an Organization’s Charitable 
 Activities are not Commensurate with Its Resources, Public Purpose or the 30
 Charitable Class Served 
Charities Must Serve a Public Purpose and Assist a Broad Charitable Class 
                                                          
89 Mandated Disclosure, supra note 86, at 681-682. 
90 The concept of rational apathy is often used with retail investors. Assume an investor owns one hundred shares of 
stock of a company that is involved in a proxy fight. A rational shareholder will expend the effort to make an 
informed decision only if the expected benefits of doing so outweigh its costs. Given the length and complexity of 
proxy statements, where the shareholder is receiving multiple communications from the contending parties, the 
opportunity cost entailed in reading the proxy statements before voting is quite high and the consequences of the 
investor’s vote having an impact on the result is virtually nil. See, Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholders Rights 
Seriously, 41 U. Cal. Davis 605, 622 (2007), Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 
520, 526-529 (1990). 
91 In a sense, giving to charity may be like voting.  In very few elections does an individual vote matter, and voting 
is in actuality a statement of responsible citizenship and public morality. 
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 Another route to state regulation of charitable solicitation is through the common law 
doctrine that a charity must serve a public purpose rather than the private benefit of individuals. 
A basic assumption of charitable status in the common law of charitable trusts and the statutory 
law of federal income taxation is that exemption from taxation requires justification in social 
terms that society is benefitting from the philanthropic entity apart from the value to individual 
beneficiaries or the moral purpose of the organization.92 Another way to express this idea is that 
the organization must serve a public purpose or benefit one of the broad categories that have 
been recognized as charitable.93   
 Charity is an elastic and expansive concept, but activities so considered must benefit a 
charitable class.  In a classic opinion the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated a charitable gift 
was one that would “benefit…an indefinite number of persons.”94 A charitable trust may fail 
because the class of persons who are to benefit is so narrow that the community has no interest in 
the performance of the trust. This is a question of degree whether the class is large enough to 
make the performance of the trust sufficient to benefit the community, so that it will be upheld as 
a charitable trust.95  Thus, a charitable trust must benefit a sufficiently large and indefinite 
                                                          
92 Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its History and Underlying 
Policy, IV Research Papers Sponsored by the [Filer] Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs 2027 
(1977).; Miriam Galston, Public Policy Constraints on Charitable Organizations, 3 Va. Tax Rev. 291, 303 (1984). 
93 See, Restatement (Third) of Trusts §28cmt .a (2003). Charitable trust purposes include: (a) the relief of poverty; 
(b) the advancement of knowledge or education; (c) the advancement of religion; (d) the promotion of health;(e) 
governmental or municipal purposes; and (f) other purposes that are beneficial to the community [emphasis added]. 
The expectation that charities must serve a public benefit and cannot violate public policy was expressed in Bob 
Jones v. United States: “Charities were to be given preferential treatment because they provide a benefit to society.” 
461 U.S. 574, 589 (1983). 
94 Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 556 (1867) (Gray, J.).    
95 Restatement (Second) of Trusts §375; 6 Austin Wakeman Scott, William Franklin Fratcher & Mark L. Ascher, 
Scott & Ascher on Trusts §38.9 (5th ed. (2009).  If the purpose of the trust is to relieve poverty, promote education, 
advance religion, or protect health, the class need not be as broad as it must be where the benefits to be conferred 
have no relation to any of these purposes [i.e., particularly purposes under Restatement §28, clause (f).] On the other 
hand, the class of persons to be benefitted may be so limited that the trust is not charitable even though the purpose 
of the trust is to relieve their poverty, to educate them, to save their souls, or to promote their health.” And in. § 
375.2 it is observed that even though “the purposes of the trust are charitable in character, the trust is not a valid 
charitable trust if the benefits are limited to too small a class of persons.” Id. at cmt. a. 
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charitable class, rather than specific private individuals.96  A similar rule applies to charitable 
corporations.97  Even if a trust is for a valid charitable purpose, the class of persons benefitted 
may be so narrow that the trust is not charitable.98  An undertaking conducted for private profit is 
not charitable even if the purpose is such that if it were not conducted for private profit, it would 
be charitable.99   
The Federal Income Tax Standard that a Charity Must Serve a Public Purpose Rather than 
 Private Interests     
 Under the section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury Regulations 
promulgated thereunder  “[a]n organization will be regarded as ‘operated exclusively’ for one or 
more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish” one of the 
purposes specified in I.R.C. §501(c)(3).100  Those purposes include activities that are religious, 
charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes.  These organizations must ensure that no 
part of their net earnings from contributions inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual.101  The charitable organization must be operated primarily to advance the purposes 
for which the organization has obtained tax-exempt status, and must serve a public rather than a 
private interest.102  
                                                          
96 Restatement (Third) of Trusts §28, cmt. a. 
97 Despite their different legal forms, common law courts subjected charities that were corporations and those that 
were trusts to the same limitations on their purposes and operations, and each also benefited from the same 
privileges. Restatement of the Law of Charitable Nonprofit Org. § 1.01 TD No 1 cmt. a (2016).  
98 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 375 cmt. a (1959). 
99 6 Scott and Ascher, supra note 94, at §38.10. 
100 Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). 
101 See, §170(c)(2)(C); Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. Cl. 1969)(Church that 
provided many benefits for founder and his family not exempt), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970). 
102 [A]n organization is not organized or operated exclusively for one or more [charitable purposes] ... unless it 
serves a public rather than a private interest. ... [I]t is necessary for an organization to establish that it is not 
organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as designated individuals, the creator or his family, 
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 In order to be exempt under section 501(c)(3), an organization must qualify under both an 
organizational and an operational test.103 The organizational test relates to the language used in 
the organization’s governing document, a trust instrument, articles of incorporation or 
association, or charter. The language must limit the purposes of the organization to one or more 
exempt purposes in § 501(c)(3) and not expressly empower the organization to engage, except to 
an insubstantial degree in any activities which do not further one or more exempt purposes.104 
Upon dissolution the organization’s assets must be distributed to another §501(c)(3) organization 
in furtherance of an exempt purpose.105 
  The operational test requires an organization’s activities to be primarily those which 
accomplish one or more exempt purposes as specified in section 501(c)(3) and not, except to an 
insubstantial part, those which do not further an exempt purpose.106  A substantial nonexempt 
purpose will disqualify an organization from tax exemption despite the number or the importance 
of its exempt purposes.107 The operational test focuses on the purpose and not on the nature of 
the activity. An organization may engage  in  a  trade  or  business  as  long as its operation 
furthers an exempt purpose and  its  primary  objective is not the production of profits.  An 
organization is not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes, unless it serves a 
public rather than a private interest.108 Whether an organization satisfies the operational test is a 
question of fact. 
                                                          
shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests. Treas. Reg. 
§1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii). 
103 Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)–1(a)(1). 
104 Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(2)(i). See also, Fishman, Schwarz & Mayer, supra note 13, at 291-292. 
105 Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(iv). 
106 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(1). 
107 See, Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945) 
108 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(ii). 
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The Commensurate Standard 
 A basic question is whether a charity provides services to the public comparable to its 
favored tax status.  In a 1964 revenue ruling, the Service introduced the “commensurate” test, 
which holds that a charitable organization that raises funds for an exempt purpose must carry on 
a charitable program commensurate with its resources and cannot confer an impermissible 
private benefit to individuals or entities associated with the charity.109  This standard merely 
states that an organization must carry on a charitable program commensurate in scope with its 
financial resources.   The Service has not been consistent in its application of the doctrine, but 
fundamentally seems to use a facts and circumstances test.110   
 Although the 1964 revenue ruling did not refer to charitable solicitation, the IRS later 
attempted to apply the test to police what it perceived as abusive contingent-fee fundraising 
where an organization used most of its funds to pay professional fundraisers. It would seem an 
organization that raised over a long period of time most of its funds from professional solicitors, 
devoted the great majority of these funds pay their contingent fees, and used a large percentage 
of the amounts remaining for administrative expenses as opposed to programmatic costs, the 
charitable program would not be commensurate with the funds contributed to the organization.   
Private Inurement and Private benefit 
                                                          
109 Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186. The one paragraph revenue ruling was primarily about whether an 
organization could qualify for exemption despite substantial unrelated business if its primary purpose was charitable 
by giving grants to other charitable organizations. The revenue ruling held that the organization could since it was 
organized and operated for charitable purposes where it was shown to be carrying on through such contributions and 
grants a charitable program commensurate in scope with its financial resources. 
110 See, Fishman, Schwarz & Mayer, supra note 13 at 544-546.  The Service’s use of a facts and circumstances test 
as applied to excessive fundraising costs was criticized by Judge Posner in United Cancer Council v. Commissioner, 
165 F.3d 1173, 1179 “That is no standard at all, and makes the tax status of charitable organizations and their donors 
a matter of the whim of the IRS.”   
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 The Service has several ways to deal with excessive payments to insiders of charities or 
others associated in some way with the organization such as their fundraisers: the prohibitions 
against private inurement, IRC § 4958, and the commensurate standard. To qualify for exempt 
status under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) no part of an organization’s net earnings 
may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.  In other words the organization 
cannot engage in transactions that primarily benefit insiders.111 A related private benefit doctrine 
denies exemption when persons other than insiders receive more than an incidental “private 
benefit.  
 While the inurement prohibition is part of the statute; the private benefit limitation is a 
product of the Treasury Regulations. It holds that an organization must serve a public purpose 
and cannot be operated for the private benefit of certain individuals or interests such as a 
founder, shareholders, or entities controlled directly or indirectly by such private interests.112  
These private interests may not strictly be insiders, but could extend to a charitable solicitation 
firm that controlled a charity through its operation of a fundraising campaign or received so 
much of the money donated that the charitable organization for all practical purposes was not 
operated exclusively for exempt purposes.  
 In United Cancer Council v. Commissioner,113 the Service sought to extend the private 
inurement and private benefit doctrines to deal with what it considered excessive contingent fee 
fundraising. One can also view the Service’s theory in the case from a commensurate 
perspective: because the fundraising firm’s control over the charity’s resources, the latter did not 
                                                          
111 IRC § 501(c)(3) provides in part: “no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual”. Treas. Reg.§1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2). 
112 Treas. Reg § 1.501(c)(3)-1d(iii). Fishman, Schwarz & Mayer, supra note 13, at 429-430. 
113 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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provide commensurate public services compared to its overall resource. Its tax exemption, 
therefore, should be revoked.   
 The United Cancer Council (UCC)114 entered into an agreement with a fundraising firm, 
Watson & Hughey (W & H).115  Because of its perilous financial condition, UCC wanted W & H 
to “front” all the expenses of the fundraising campaign, though it would be reimbursed by UCC 
as soon as the campaign generated sufficient donations to cover those expenses. W & H agreed, 
but it demanded in return that it be UCC’s exclusive fundraiser during the five-year term of the 
contract, that it be given co-ownership of the list of prospective donors generated by its 
fundraising efforts, and that UCC be forbidden, both during the term of the contract and after its 
expiration, to sell or lease the list, although it would be free to use it to solicit repeat donations. 
There were no restrictions on W & H.116   
 Over the five-year term of the contract, W & H raised $28.8 million of which $26.5 
million went to W & H for expenses.  UCC received $2.3 million, which was spent on services 
to cancer patients and research.117  The IRS revoked UCC’s charitable exemption alleging it was 
not operated exclusively for charitable purposes, but also for the private benefit of the 
                                                          
114 UCC was a charity that sought, through affiliated local cancer societies, to encourage preventive and ameliorative 
approaches to cancer, as distinct from searching for a cure, the emphasis of the better-known American Cancer 
Society.  
115W & H had a long history of conflict with state regulators. See, Commonwealth v. Watson & Hughey Co., 563 
A.2d 1276 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989). Over a two year period from 1989 to 1991, W & H was found guilty of 
violations of charitable solicitation laws in fourteen states and paid fines and restitution of $ 2.1 million. See 
America’s Worst Charities, TAMPA BAY TIMES & CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING, (2013), available at  
http://charitysearch.apps.cironline.org/detail/watson-hughey-12448.  Despite this history, W & H remains in 
business under a different name, Direct Response Consulting Services. 
116United Cancer Council, 165 F.3d at 1175. W & H mailed eighty million letters soliciting contributions to UCC. 
Each letter contained advice about preventing cancer, as well as a pitch for donations; seventy percent of the letters 
also offered the recipient a chance to win a sweepstakes. Id. 
117UCC did not renew the contract when it expired by its terms in 1989. Instead, it hired another fundraising 
organization with disastrous results. The following year, UCC declared bankruptcy, and within months the IRS 
revoked its tax exemption retroactively to the date on which UCC had signed the contract with W & H. The effect 
was to make the IRS a major creditor of UCC in the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 1176. 
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fundraising company. The Service also claimed that part of the charity’s net earnings inured to 
the benefit of a private shareholder or individual, W & H.  UCC appealed to the Tax Court, 
which upheld the revocation on the ground of private inurement, but did not reach the private 
benefit issue.118  There followed an appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 The Court in a decision by Judge Richard Posner found no private inurement.119 The 
Service had not contended that any part of UCC’s earnings found its way into the pockets of any 
members of the charity’s board, or that any members of the board were owners, managers, or 
employees of W & H, or relatives or even friends of any of W & H’s owners, managers, or 
employees. It conceded that the contract between charity and fundraiser was negotiated at an 
arm’s length basis.120 The Service argued that the contract was so advantageous to W & H and so 
disadvantageous to UCC that the charity must be deemed to have surrendered the control of its 
operations and earnings to its professional solicitor. 
 As far as the high fundraising costs, the Seventh Circuit found that W & H got a 
“charitable bang” from the mailings, which contained some educational materials in support of 
its educational goals. Importantly, it said that the cost of fundraising, that is, the ratio of expenses 
to net charitable receipts, was unrelated to the issue of inurement.121 W & H’s favorable contract 
was due to the desperation of UCC, rather than disloyalty by the board. Nor was there any 
diversion of assets to insiders.  
                                                          
118 UCC v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 17 (1997). 
119Id. at 1178–79. 
120A committee of the board picked W & H, and another committee of the board was created to negotiate the 
contract between the charity and the professional solicitor. Id. at 1175. 
121Id. at 1178. 
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 Judge Posner then suggested that the private benefit doctrine, in certain situations, could 
be used to deal with particularly harsh agreements.  Under that theory, UCC would be considered 
operating for the private benefit of the fundraiser.  The Court remanded the private benefit issue 
to the Tax Court.122  
 UCC was a case of statutory construction, but it could be looked at as a question of 
constitutional law too. UCC might have argued that the statutory private inurement prohibition 
and the Treasury Regulation containing the Private Benefit doctrine impermissibly impinged 
upon the protected speech of their solicitation campaign. The fundamental issue in response to 
that argument would be whether the resources spent for UCC’s charitable programs after 
payment of fundraising fees were commensurate with the total resources raised.   
The Prohibition against Excess Benefit Transactions IRS §4958 
 The unsuccessful effort of the UCC case to link excess fundraising costs to private 
inurement aside, the IRS rarely used the revocation of exemption penalty for violations of the 
private inurement or private benefit proscriptions. Because of the doctrines’ ineffectiveness in 
curbing abuses, the disproportionate nature of the penalty, and the fact it targeted the 
organization, rather than the individual wrongdoers, made it unsuitable in many cases.  
 As a result Congress enacted IRS § 4958, the so-called intermediate sanctions legislation, 
which imposes an excise tax on individuals, termed “disqualified persons”, who engage in excess 
                                                          
122Id. at 1179. See also Lisa A. Runquist, How to Keep Your Nonprofit out of Trouble with the IRS, NONPROFIT 
RESOURCES (Oct. 1, 2015), http://runquist.com/how-to-keep-your-nonprofit-out-of-trouble-with-the-irs (On remand 
the private benefit issue was never reached, for the case was settled. UCC, which had filed for bankruptcy, conceded 
it was not entitled to exemption for the years 1986-1989, and the I.R.S. restored UCC’s exemption for 1990 forward. 
As a condition of the settlement, UCC agreed to cease raising funds from the general public and to limit its activities 
to accepting charitable bequests and transmitting them to local cancer counsels for direct care of patients.). 
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benefit transactions, either of the inurement or private benefit variety.123  There is a possible tax 
on the charity’s executives as well.124 Theoretically, IRC § 4958 could be used against a 
fundraiser guilty of excessive financial benefits, where the solicitor controlled the charity or the 
contract between them was egregious.  There has been minimal enforcement under § 4958, 
though charities have used the complicated procedures in the regulations to sanitize 
compensation and other transactions so as to avoid the “excessive benefit” designation.  Using 
the legislation to police excessive fundraising expenses is also hindered by what is called a “first 
bite” or initial contract exception.   
The Initial Contract Exception   
 The tax on excess benefit transactions does not apply to an initial written agreement with 
fixed payments between an organization and an individual, who will become a disqualified 
person upon signing the contract.125  This removes from the intermediate sanctions regime the 
initial contract between the fundraiser and the tax-exempt organization. Neither the statute, the 
legislative history, nor the proposed regulations to § 4958 contained an initial contract exception. 
It emerged in the fallout from the Service’s defeat in United Cancer Council, where the court 
held that private inurement couldn’t result from a contractual relationship negotiated at arms-
length with a party having no prior relationship with the exempt organization, regardless of the 
relative bargaining strengths of the parties. The initial contract exemption removed certain fixed 
                                                          
123 The ‘intermediate sanctions’ refer to the excise tax penalty, which is intermediate to revocation of tax exemption. 
124 In egregious situations the Service can still revoke an exemption, after making a determination of all relevant 
facts and circumstances, taking into account a number of actors including the size and scope of the organization’s 
regular and ongoing activities that further exempt purposes before and after excess benefit transactions occurred. 
Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(f)(2)(ii). 
125 Initial contract or agreement  means a binding written contract between an applicable tax exempt organization 
and a person, who was not a disqualified person within the meaning of I.R.C. § 4958 and Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3 
prior to entering the contract. Treas. Reg. 53.4958-4(a)(3) (2002). 
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payments made pursuant to an initial contract between an organization and the third party.126  
However, there may be a loophole in the initial contract exemption that allows such contracts to 
come under section 4958.127  
 Ideally, the Service would enforce excessive, deceitful or fraudulent charitable 
solicitation, but at present that is wishful thinking.  Because of budget cuts, the political hostility 
of Congress, and a seeming lack of willpower, the IRS has retreated from its oversight 
responsibilities.128  This means that the states or some other federal agency such as the Federal 
Trade Commission should step into the breach to apply the legal doctrines discussed above.  A 
problem is that few states have proactive and vigorous enforcement against charity fraud, but 
through the use of common law doctrines such as the requirement of commensurate charitable 
purpose, combined with a lesser standard of judicial scrutiny of impingement on speech, 
misleading charitable solicitation can be curtailed. 
Reconfiguring the Facts of Riley 
 It is clear from the Supreme Court trilogy that a statute mandating a solicitor to disclose 
the amount of funds raised that will be turned over to the charity is content-based speech and will 
                                                          
126Staff of J. Comm. on Tax’n, 109th Cong., Rep. on Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax 
Expenditures, at 268 (Comm. Print 2005). 
127 A fixed payment does not include any amount paid to a person under a reimbursement or similar arrangement 
where any person with respect to the amount of expenses incurred or reimbursed exercises discretion. Treas. Reg. § 
53.4958-4(a)(3)(ii)(A) (2002).  The standard fundraising agreement contains a percentage of receipts from the 
campaign that belong to the solicitor.  Nevertheless, the solicitor also has the right of reimbursement of expenses 
and manages the campaign. It can control the amount of expenses incurred, the primary reason that many 
fundraising campaigns wind up with the charity not only failing to obtain additional resources, but still owing the 
solicitor for expenses beyond the amount raised. In the course of running the campaign, the solicitor controls the 
expenses. This would seem to be a non-fixed liability and one could argue not subject to the initial contract 
exception. For an elaboration of this argument, see, Who Can Regulate Fraudulent Charitable Solicitation?,  supra 
note 12 at 31-34. 
128 There have been calls by serious scholars to remove the Service from the oversight of charities. See, Evelyn Brody, 
& Marcus Owens, Exile to Main Street: the I.R.S.’s diminished role in overseeing tax-exempt organizations,  91 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 859-893 (2016); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, ‘The Better Part of Valour Is Discretion’: Should the IRS Change 
or Surrender Its Oversight of Tax Exempt Organizations?, 7 Col. J. Tax L. 80 (2016). 
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not pass constitutional muster.  The discretionary power of an official to deny or delay a permit 
when protected speech is involved, likely will not be upheld as well.  The North Carolina statute 
in Riley was also flawed as it did not create a sufficient nexus between the state’s interest and the 
statutory regulation of permissible fees.129 
  Let us reconfigure facts of Riley, so that the cost of fundraising is not directly regulated, 
nor is the impact on the charity’s speech. The official or state disapproval reflects an 
organization’s lack of charitable activity over a period of time given its resources, and this 
creates a rebuttable presumption that the charity is not serving a charitable purpose that is 
commensurate with its means.130 Assume that a charity over a period of eight years or more 
spends at least eighty percent of funds raised in the name of the charity to pay its solicitation 
firm, and after allocation of general overhead expenses the charity spends an average of less than 
fifteen percent of its budget on activities toward the attainment of its mission.131  Further assume 
                                                          
129 487 U.S. 793 n.7. 
130 A rebuttable presumption is an inference drawn from certain facts that establishes a prima facie case about the 
inference, which may be overcome by the introduction of contrary evidence.   
131  Long after this hypothetical was conceived, a real world example offered a similar fact pattern.  The Illinois 
Attorney General forced a telemarketer, Safety Publications, to cease operations in the state because the firm misled 
donors to raise millions on behalf of veterans and did not properly report the funds it raised for charity. One of the 
co-founders, who had failed to disclose his felony arson conviction when registering as a fundraiser, was barred for 
life.  The other co-founder agreed to a three year ban.   
 Safety reported raising $4.9 million for VietNow, the primary charity, and some other organizations from 
2008 through 2014 but gave the nonprofits only about 15 cents of every dollar raised in those seven years and kept 
the rest for itself.  Many of those charities in turn spent large sums on administrative overhead, leaving pennies for 
those in need.  Safety did not properly report the funds it raised for the VietNow, among other breaches of state 
charity laws. It violated Illinois law against using felons to raise funds for charity by employing since 2007 at least 
ten callers, who served prison terms for bank robbery, forgery child rape and other felonies.  This was the attorney 
general’s third enforcement action against the fundraiser.  
 VietNow was one of the respondents in the Supreme Court case of Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. 
Telemarketing, supra note 78, where the fundraisers made knowingly deceptive and materially false statements to 
potential donors that each dollar donated would be used for charitable endeavors, when in fact 85% went to the 
fundraisers.  The Supreme Court unanimously held that fraudulent charitable solicitation was unprotected by the 
First Amendment. Other actions have been brought against VietNow in Michigan and Missouri.   VietNow has 
changed its name to Veterans Now. See, David Jackson, Chicago telemarketer is shut down after Tribune 
investigation of charity law violations, Chicago Trib. (June 1, 2017) available at 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ct-telemarketer-charity-met-20170531-
story.html?elqTrackId=b481acea41254d3ba73beecf7131fc37&elq=7f6627d219874744b435fab657066854&elqaid=
14148&elqat=1&elqCampaignId=5934 .  
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a state enacts legislation that similarly situated charities create a presumption that the 
organization is serving the interests of either its insiders, directors, officers and key employees or 
benefitting external contractors, such as a professional solicitation firm, and therefore its delivery 
of charitable services is not commensurate with the common law and federal or state tax 
requirements that charities must serve a public purpose.    
 What this hypothetical suggests is that tax exemption of charities be judged under a 
standard that would condition continued exemption on whether the charity, given its resources 
and programs, provides a public service commensurate with its size.  If not, the charity could 
lose its exemption from state or federal taxation.  The organization’s donors would not receive 
the normal charitable deduction as provided by law.   
 In Bob Jones v. United States, the Court quoted the legislative history of the charitable 
exemption statute of 1917 where Senator Hollis articulated its rationale: “For every dollar that a 
man contributes to these public charities, educational, scientific, or otherwise, the public gets 100 
percent.”132  In the presumption used in the hypothetical, the reverse is true.  For all of the money 
contributed, the public gets a paltry percentage that benefits society or the charity’s beneficiaries. 
Unlike the cost of fundraising legislation in the Supreme Court trilogy, denial of exemption does 
not directly restrict charities’ protected speech.  Any impact on speech is indirect and tenuous. It 
removes a tax benefit to a third party. There is no constitutional right to preferential tax 
treatment.  
                                                          
 
132 461 U.S at 590 quoting 55 Cong. Rec. 6728 (1917).  
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Would such legislation pass constitutional muster, and under what standard would it be reviewed 
by a court? Oregon has enacted a statute that fits the hypothetical.    
The Oregon Approach to Excessive Fundraising Costs 
 Oregon has introduced a novel approach to states’ repeated efforts to control the high 
administrative and fundraising costs of charities.  It enacted legislation that allows the attorney 
general to disqualify charities from receiving tax-deductible contributions for Oregon income state 
tax purposes. If an Oregon charity fails to expend at least thirty  percent of the organization’s “total 
annual functional expenses” on program services as that phrase is used on IRS Form 990 when 
those expenses are averaged over the most recent three fiscal years, it will lose its state tax 
exemption though remain federally exempt from taxation under IRC §501(c)(3).133   
 The statute is a variant application of a commensurate test to contingent fee fundraising.   
Unlike Riley and the other Supreme Court CFR cases, there is no attempt to prohibit a charity that 
fails the standard from soliciting for contributions.  The Oregon statute implies that the state will 
not subsidize donors through the charitable deduction or the organization’s continued exemption 
from taxation until its charitable activities are commensurate with the resources it receives.  
   Exempted from the legislation are private foundations, community trusts or foundations, 
qualified charitable remainder trusts, charities that do not have to file the Form 990, and charities 
that have operated for less than four years. The attorney general can exempt organizations that 
were accumulating money for a specific purpose such as a capital campaign or present “other 
mitigating circumstances.” Affected charities must disclose to their donors that they cannot 
deduct their contributions for state tax purposes or face fines up to $25,000.   
                                                          
133 Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 128.760 to 128.769 (2017). 
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 Unlike the Supreme Court cases that struck down attempts to limit the cost of fundraising 
through statutory limits, this legislation regulates the availability of charities to use the state 
subsidy provided by tax exemption.  There is no licensing requirement or other restriction on 
soliciting.  If the attorney general disqualifies a charity it may continue to solicit funds, but must 
disclose to potential donors that there is no charitable deduction for their Oregon taxes, though 
the federal deduction under IRC §170 would remain. Apparently, many Oregon charities would 
fail to keep their state tax exemptions.134   
 Oregon’s approach is arguably similar to the challenge to section 501(c)(3) that was 
upheld in Regan v. Taxation with Representation.135  There, an organization, Taxation With 
Representation (TWR), was denied exemption under §501(c)(3) because it appeared that a 
substantial part of its activities consisted of attempting to influence legislation which is not 
permitted by §501(c)(3).136  TWR claimed the prohibition against substantial lobbying was 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment and the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The alleged equal protection violation was that taxpayers 
could deduct a certain percentage of contributions to veterans’ organizations, some of which had 
unlimited lobbying privileges in furtherance of their exempt purposes.137 
 The Supreme Court in a decision by Chief Justice Rehnquist held that that section 
501(c)(3) did not violate the First Amendment or the equal protection clause of the Fifth 
                                                          
134 Using the Guidestar data base, the Chronicle of Philanthropy scanned the Form 990s of more than 100,000 
nonprofits and found that more than one-fifth would not have met the guidelines of the Oregon bill.  Of that 
group, nearly 96 percent would have failed the 30 percent requirement because they left blank or filled in zero on 
the line where they were to report how much they spent on programs.  Lisa Chiu, Many Charities Don’t Tell IRS 
How Much They Spend on Programs, Chron. Philanthropy, May 1, 2011, at   
http://philanthropy.com/article/Many-Charities-Don-t-Tell/127302/.    
135 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
136 TWR could create a §501(c)(4) organization to pursue its lobbying goals though such organizations are not 
eligible to receive tax deductible contributions. 
137 Regan, 461 U.S. at 548. 
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Amendment, since it was rational for Congress to decide that, even though it would not subsidize 
substantial lobbying by charities generally, it would subsidize lobbying by veterans' 
organizations.138  The Court concluded that Congress in granting tax exemption to certain 
nonprofit organizations that did not engage in substantial lobbying activities simply chose not to 
pay for nonprofit corporation's lobbying and did not regulate any First Amendment activity.139 
Additionally, legislatures had especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions 
in tax statutes.140 
 Even though IRS §501(c)(3) might have impinged upon speech, it was not intended to 
suppress any ideas nor was there any demonstration that it had that effect, and thus the statutory 
provision did not employ any suspect classification that warranted a higher level of scrutiny to 
determine whether the prohibition against substantial lobbying was invalid under the equal 
protection component of Fifth Amendment. The standard applied by the Court was whether the 
statute had a rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose.141  Significantly, the Court 
also stated that the legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right did 
not infringe on that right and was not subject to strict scrutiny.142 
 The Oregon statute has been challenged by the Car Donation Foundation, a charity that 
averaged spending only 20.7% on its program services over its three most recent fiscal years.143 
The organization claimed the statute violated Article 1 of the Oregon Constitution and the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and operated to chill its solicitation speech.  
                                                          
138 Id. at 550-551. 
139 Id. at 546. 
140 Id. at 547. 
141Id. at 548-54.  
142 Id.at 549.37 
143 Matter of Car Donation Fdn., Ore. Dept. Justice, Agency Case No. 137300/XCT0031-15 (April 3, 2017). 
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Rejecting a motion to dismiss, an administrative law judge upheld the statute, concluding it did 
not restrict the organization’s rights to engage in protected charitable speech, but affected the 
result of its solicitation efforts as it related to the donor’s ability to deduct contributions for 
purposes of Oregon’s income tax.144  The requirement of disclosing the lack of state charitable 
exemption was necessary to prevent misleading potential donors. As in Regan, the administrative 
judge held that Oregon can determine which organizations it wished to subsidize through state 
tax-exemption. The Order may be appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals.145 Presumably, if 
the Oregon statute comes under the holding of Regan, and an intermediate scrutiny standard is 
applied, it will pass constitutional muster 
VI. Application of an Intermediate Standard of Review for Judicial Evaluation of 
 Charitable Solicitation Regulation 
 The various attempts to regulate excessive charitable solicitation costs have foundered on 
the protections afforded speech that contains any educational element. The Supreme Court has 
applied a standard of strict scrutiny when reviewing such legislation that directly impinges upon 
constitutionally protected speech. This section proposes that content neutral charitable 
solicitation regulation should be evaluated under an intermediate standard of review when the 
                                                          
144 Matter of Car Donation Fdn., Ore. Dept. Justice, Agency Case No. 137300/XCT0031-15 (Ruling on Motion to 
Dismiss 9 (June 10, 2016). 
 The Oregon statute has been the subject of three administrative hearings: 1) a ruling on a motion to dismiss 
and notice of intent to issue disqualification, which focused primarily on the constitutionality of the Oregon statute 
under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution; and notice of opportunity for a hearing (Ruling on Motion to 
Dismiss Notice); and 2) Proposed Order Final (Proposed Order), which examined whether the statute violated the 
Commerce Clause under Article I, §8, clause 3 of the United States’ Constitution or Article I, § 8 of the Oregon 
Constitution.  Both hearings upheld the Oregon statute, denied the motion to dismiss and required the Car Donation 
Foundation to disclose to Oregon donors that contributions to it are not deductible for Oregon income tax purposes. 
Matter of Car Donation Foundation, Agency Case No. 137300/XCT0031-15, Ruling on Motion to Dismiss (June 16, 
2016) and Final Order (April 28, 2017).  Respondent Car Donation Foundation then proceeded to a contested 
hearing on its motion to dismiss, which it lost. An appeal to the Oregon Court of Appeals is pending.   




scrutinized organization conducts fundraising campaigns over several years that offer minimal 
educational content in their solicitations, incur high costs, and deliver an insubstantial amount of 
services in the attainment of the organization’s charitable mission.  
 The level of scrutiny applied to a statute ultimately is an issue of judicial discretion. 
When a legislature enacts a law, it gives the officials and judges who interpret it, directives or 
legal principles as to how they are to exercise their discretion. These directives or principles are 
commonly classified as rules or standards.146  
Rules 
 Rules are restrictive for decision makers for they confine them to facts, leaving arbitrary 
and subjective choices to be worked out elsewhere.147  Rules bring stability and certainty.  
Individuals affected by rules should know the consequences of their actions and can plan to 
avoid them.  They promote equal treatment, minimal information costs in decision making and 
predictability.148 
  A legal directive that is a rule captures a background principle or policy in a form that 
operates independently and may be over- or under-inclusive in its application.  Decision makers 
follow rules even when direct application of the background principle to the facts at hand would 
                                                          
146 Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court—1991 Term—Foreword:  The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. 
L. Rev. 22, 58-59 (1991) [hereinafter, Foreword]. The template discussed herein is based on the framework of 
Kathleen Sullivan in several articles, particularly: Foreword, and Post-Liberal judging: The Roles of Categorization 
and Balancing, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 293 (1992) [hereinafter, Post-liberal judging]. 
147 Foreward, supra Note 146, at 58. 
148 Factors that justify rules include promotion of fairness in that decision makers act consistently and provide 
certainty.  Rules are efficient for the decision maker compared to fact–based standards because there are minimal 
informational costs to reaching a decision and predictability of outcomes. Rules bind the governmental decision so 
that individuals can plan. They also limit the scope of decision makers’ jurisdiction, which provides equality of 
treatment. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 960-977, Philip T. Hackney, Charitable 
Organization Oversight: Rules v. Standards, 13 Pitt. Tax Rev. 83, 109-110 (2015). 
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produce different results. Rules eliminate subjective actions of officials against unpopular 
individuals, organizations, or causes as in the arbitrary refusal to grant a solicitation permit, at 
issue in many of the earlier cases involving door-to-door fundraising.149  For judges, rules 
provide for restraint, and the separation of the law from the malleability of the use of facts.150  
However, rules can mask bias.  They may not fit every situation and may lead to unfairness or 
injustice in a particular case. Strict scrutiny is a rule. 
Standards 
 A legal directive is standard-like when it collapses decision making into the direct 
application of a background principle or policy to a specific fact situation. A rule offers less 
discretion than a standard. Standards allow for a decrease in errors of under- and over-
inclusiveness by giving the decision maker more discretion then do rules. Standards enable the 
decision maker to examine the totality of the circumstances and apply them to the case at hand.  
Another case with different facts may lead to a different decision.151  Thus, standards provide 
more flexibility and may be more likely to achieve justice in a particular case. Standards promote 
fairness in similar factual situations and are less arbitrary. Whereas rules remain fixed, standards 
are more flexible and permit decision makers to adapt to changing circumstances. They force 
judges to be more accountable to the facts of a particular case.152  
 Another way to frame these concepts is the distinction commonly found in constitutional 
law between categorization and balancing.  Categorization corresponds to rules, balancing to 
                                                          
149 Cf. Hackney, supra note 148, at 103. 
150 Id. at 105. 
151Foreword, supra 146, at 58-59. 
152Foreword, supra note 146, at 66-69. 
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standards. Categorization is taxonomic. Balancing weighs competing rights or interests.153 
Categorization defines bright line boundaries and then classifies fact situations as falling on one 
side or the other.  For example, if strict scrutiny of a statute is applied, the government likely 
loses. If rational scrutiny applies, say with an economic regulation, the government usually wins.  
Levels of Scrutiny 
 When a court applies strict scrutiny to a law, the legislature must either have significantly 
abridged a fundamental right with the law's enactment or have passed a law that involves a 
suspect classification such as race or religion.  Where government attempts to regulate the 
content of speech, the Supreme Court requires the government to provide substantial justification 
for the interference with the right of free speech. The noted constitutional scholar, Gerald 
Gunther, quipped that strict scrutiny is "strict in name, but fatal in practice."154  In other words, 
the government almost always loses if a court finds a strict scrutiny standard of review.   
 Under a rational review standard the challenged law must be rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest. This is the most lenient standard.  Rational basis review 
generally is used in cases where no fundamental rights or suspect classifications are at issue, 
such as economic legislation.  Recall in Riley, the state and the dissent categorized the statute as 
economic legislation, but the majorities applied the strict scrutiny standard. 
 Intermediate scrutiny, the third approach between strict and rational review, is used in 
some contexts to determine a law's constitutionality. To pass the intermediate scrutiny standard, 
the challenged law must further an important government interest by means that are substantially 
                                                          
153 Post-Liberal judging, supra note 146, at 293-294. 
154 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971Term--Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv.  L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972. 
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related to that interest.  Intermediate scrutiny is less rigorous than strict scrutiny and involves a 
balancing based upon the facts before the court. Both strict and rational reviews are categories or 
rules, whereas intermediate scrutiny involves a balancing based upon the facts before the court. 
 Balancing gives judges more discretion. It occurs where the judge places competing 
rights and interests on a scale and weighs them against each other. The judge may apply a 
multitude of factors to reach a result.155 A criticism of balancing is that judges become legislators 
because of their exercise of the use of discretion in deciding cases. There are valid arguments for 
categorization and for balancing.156   
Effects of the Strict Scrutiny Standard on Regulation of Charitable Solicitation 
 A problem with the strict scrutiny standard of review for charitable solicitation regulation 
is that the spirit of the rule and sometimes its substance can be evaded.157  Thus, a strict scrutiny 
rule that assumes that the educational component of the solicitation is always intertwined with 
the non-educational parts of the message, the mere pitch for funds, may not be empirically 
correct.  It ignores the fact that the educational component may be an insignificant and even 
irrelevant to the solicitation part of the message.  This can allow unprincipled fundraisers and 
charities to elude the strictures against deceptive fundraising. 
  Regulation of charitable solicitation that impinges on speech is almost always reviewed 
under the strict scrutiny standard. This allows the unscrupulous fundraiser or sham charity to 
evade meaningful review of its activities. Strict scrutiny discourages regulators from oversight of 
questionable and inefficient organizations. Since it is almost impossible for a speech regulation 
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to overcome the strict scrutiny standard absent outright fraud, which is difficult of proof and a 
substantial consumer of scarce resources, rational regulators may be dissuaded from pursuing 
cases with a Sisyphean chance of success.  
Applying the Intermediate Scrutiny Standard to Charitable Solicitation Regulation 
 Intermediate scrutiny would enable attorneys general to more easily to challenge the 
activities of charities that exist for the organization’s fundraisers or insiders. High fundraising 
costs over a period of time may indicate that the organization is not serving a charitable purpose, 
but is benefiting insiders (private inurement), serving a private benefit to others, or assisting no 
recognized charitable class.  
 It is extremely difficult for a content or viewpoint based law to pass judicial scrutiny.  If a 
statute is neither content nor viewpoint based, it need not be analyzed under the strict scrutiny 
standard.158  When a court applies an intermediate scrutiny lens, governments are afforded a 
wider leeway to regulate features of speech unrelated to its content.  However, it is not so easy to 
get a court to apply an intermediate review standard.   
 For a law to meet the requirements of intermediate scrutiny, it “must be ‘narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.’”159 This inquiry recognizes that the First 
Amendment “does not simply guard against an impermissible desire to censor.” A government 
may attempt to impermissibly restrict speech purely as a matter of convenience.160  While 
governments are afforded a wider leeway to regulate features of speech unrelated to its content 
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or viewpoint, even if it is content neutral, “…[b]y demanding a close fit between ends and 
means, the tailoring requirement prevents the government from too readily ‘sacrific[ing] speech 
for efficiency.’ ”161  Ultimately, for a content-neutral regulation “to be narrowly tailored, it must 
not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate 
interests.’ ”162  While this does not require that a subject regulation “ ‘be the least restrictive or 
least intrusive means of’ serving the government's interests...the government still ‘may not 
regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not 
serve to advance its goals.’ ”163  
 In McCutcheon v. FEC the Court noted that in the First Amendment context, even if strict 
scrutiny is not required, a reasonable fit is necessary: “The fit must represent not necessarily the 
single best disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served,’ ... that 
employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but ... a means narrowly tailored to achieve 
the desired objective.”164  Thus, the burden is on the government enacting any speech-impinging 
law to present evidence that supports its need for the regulation, and the speech restriction 
materially advances an important or substantial interest and demonstrates that the harms that 
generated the regulation are real, and the regulation will alleviate these harms in a direct and 
material way.165   
 An argument unsupported by evidence favoring a speech restriction will not carry the 
government’s burden.  Courts demand evidence that the regulated conduct actually threatened 
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the government's interests, and will assess the viability of alternative means of advancing such 
interests.  The regulation in question must be properly calibrated to its justifying purpose. This 
element of calibration goes to the very heart of the constitutional requirement that the regulation 
“not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate 
interests.’”166 
 In McCullen v. Coakley the Court applied an intermediate scrutiny standard to conclude 
that the statute in issue was not narrowly tailored.  The Court grounded its conclusion in the fact 
that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts provided no evidence supporting its arguments. It was 
not sufficient justification to state that other approaches had not worked.167  
The Need for Empirical Data on the Educational Content of Charitable Solicitations 
 In reviewing the fiduciary appeals in the Cancer Care case, it is surprising how 
insignificant were the educational components of the solicitation message.  Remember that the 
litigation was not against the fundraising firms, but the sham charities that presumably, 
ultimately control the content of the message.  The lesson of McCullen and other cases is that 
empirical data or other evidence will be necessary to convince a court to apply an intermediate 
scrutiny standard and to uphold the legislation.   
 There is a need for social scientists to devise studies that can measure and evaluate the 
educational content of solicitations as well as the attitudes of recipients who receive them.  
Surveys are necessary to analyze the speech, measuring its content, whether recipients reacted, 
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read or even noticed the educational components.  Studies of donors and recipients of requests 
for funds may enable the introduction of credible and persuasive evidence that in the context of 
the total solicitation, the educational part of the message is irrelevant. Such empirical evidence 
could be used to reinforce the fact that the purported charity is using the solicitation for the 
private benefit of the insiders of the insiders, the fundraising firm or others.  It may be that the 
results of such research will force charities and their fundraising firms to provide more serious 
educational content in their solicitations.  That would be a positive result.  
VII. Conclusion 
 This article has maintained that the realities of much fundraising speech is primarily 
commercial in nature as opposed to educational.  This contrasts with the Supreme Court’s view 
that the educational component of a solicitation is always intertwined with the commercial part 
of the message, justifying a strict scrutiny of review whenever a regulation impinges on 
fundraising speech.  If a tax exempt organization does not carry on a charitable program 
commensurate in scope with its financial resources, regulators should be able to withdraw the 
benefits of exemption to the organization or its donors.  One approach should be to disallow the 
donors’ deductions for their contributions normally permitted by law, which under Regan would 
not run afoul of constitutional requirements. 
 In reviewing regulatory efforts, courts should apply an intermediate standard of review 
that will allow a balancing of the state’s interest in assuring the honesty of charities with the 
impact on the charity’s rights of speech. Application of an intermediate standard of scrutiny 
allows regulators to oversee more easily those few charities and professional solicitors, who 
consciously evade the law, and will enable the courts more easily to reach a just result, which 
will benefit the nonprofit sector, the donating public, and the beneficiaries of charities’ activities. 
